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JURISTICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction as a matter of right to hear and determine this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether or not the court abused its discretion by awarding a default judgment against
defendant, Ms. White when she was improperly served.
Whether or not the summons and complaint are fatally defective, because to contain
Pertinent information, which is required under Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.
Whether or not the service is fatally defective, because the summons and complaint fails to
contain pertinent information on it.
Whether or not the court's rendering a default judgment against Ms. White without
hearing the case was an abuse of discretion.
Whether or not the default judgment should be set aside and the action dismissed against
defendant, Ms. White.
4

Whether or not the standards as outlined in Lucas v. Murray City apply to all public and
private entities, to include the courts.
CONSTIUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article 1 § 7 of the Utah State Constitution (Due Process)
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Article 14 § 14 of the United States Constitution {Due Process}
No state shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.

PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
Rule 3(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) byfilinga complaint with the court, or
(2) by service of a summons together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4.
Rule 4(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the defendant
need not answer if the complaint is notfiledwithin 10 days after service and shall state the
telephone number of the clerk of the court where the defendant may call at least 13 days after
service to determine if the complaint has been filed.
Rule 4(b)\ Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
Under Rule 3(a)(1) The complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after thefilingof
the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause.
5

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
Permits a court to reconsider a grant of summary judgment when the party seeking
reconsideration presents legal theories that have not been considered already, and presents
material facts that have not been considered before this court at the time of the original decision
to grant summary judgment.

Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto
if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

...
...
...
Insufficiency of Process,
Insufficiency of Service of Process,
...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action is to dismiss the Summons, Complaint and its subsequent service due to a
fatally defective summons. The Summons and/or Complaint failed to contain pertinent
information. On the summons and/or complaint, which is required under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures,

6

The court and plaintiff continues to ignore the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures when they
litigate cases. The courts and plaintiff have policies and procedures to comply with and the court
and the plaintiff continue to willfully ignore those rules and procedures.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On 25 July 2002, Defendant filed a Motion to dismiss the action, because the Plaintiff
failed to have the Defendant properly served.
2. On 16 October 2002, the court signed an order granting the plaintiffs Summary
Judgment. The court prior to this never considered the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
3. On 31 October 2002, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Grant of Summary
Judgment.
4. On 29 November 2002, the court denied the Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Grant
Of Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT(S)
It is the position of the defendant that the summons together with the copy of the
Complaint and the subsequent service of these documents are fatally defective, because
They do not contain pertinent information on them, which is required under the Rule 10(a)
Of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.
In this case the plaintiff failed to do so and their mistake could and must be
classified as fatal.
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The defendant can attack a fatally defective summons and its service at anytime.
The court failed to obtain jurisdiction over defendant, Ms. White because of improper
service the court and plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures as established by the Utah State Supreme Court.
In addition to this the plaintiff failed to ensure that the required information was
Contained in the summons and/or complaint the defendant's rights under Article 1 § 7 of
The Utah State Constitution and Article 14 of the United States Constitution to due
process.
These Requirements are necessary for any defendant to properly defend, if it is not
provided then one cannot be required to properly defend the matter. Furthermore,
because the court failed to ensure that the defendant, Ms. White was improperly served,
violated her rights under Article 1 § 7 of the Utah State Constitution and Article 14 of the
United States Constitution to due process. These requirements are necessary for any
defendant to properly defend, if it is not provided then one cannot be required to properly
defend the matter.
These matters are more fully disputed below.

POINT 1
DEFENDANT CAN ATTADCK FATALLY DEFECTIVE SUMMONS AND
SERVICE AT ANYTIME
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures it states,
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Every defense, in law or fact, to claim relief in any pleading, whether a claim,

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader is made by motion:

8. ...
9. ...
10. Insufficiency Of Process,
11. Insufficiency of Service of Process,
12. ..."

The rule is clear at the point of the pleader the following defenses may be made by
motion:
a. Insufficiency of Process and
b. Insufficiency of Service of Process.
The service process server failed to annotate their name, date, time, and official
Title if any, which is required under Rule 4(k

) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
And Utah Code Annotated § 78-12a-2(3) .

9

POINT II
COURT FAILED TO OBTAIN JURISTICTION
Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures states.

Five days after service of process, proof thereof shall be made by written
admission or waiver of service by person to be served, duly acknowledged or otherwise
proved, is purposed to safeguard against entering default judgment against persons except
where it is satisfactorily appears that they that they have consented thereto.
Defendant Ms. White was not properly served in this action. The court
Does not have jurisdiction over a party who has been improperly served. The court in
Locke v. Peterson. 285 P2d 111 and Callahan v. Sheafer 877 P.2d 1259.
Plaintiff failed to file a Return of Service which is in violation of
Rule 4(h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. There was no written admission or waiver filed
with the court within the five days of service from the service processor, plaintiff, or
plaintiffs Attorney.
There was no written admission or waiver filed with the court within
The five days of service from the service processor, plaintiff, or plaintiffs
Attorney.
The Plaintiff then failed to file an Answer to the Motion for dismissal and
Proceeded to file a Summary Judgment Motion nine months later not in the 120 day
Allotted time from the court. This is required under Rule (4) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures.
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By the clear language of the rule"..., at the option of the pleader be made
motion". The defendant clearly followed this rule.
Therefore, the defendant can attack the case at any time by motion pursuant to the
language of the rule. The defendant moves this court for an order reversing the lower
court default judgment and dismissing this action all together, because the court should
have never entered a default judgment against the defendant when there was absolutely no
evidence to show that she was properly served and the plaintiff and his attorney
new the time allowed in filing Answers and Motions in a case is not nine months.

Therefore, Under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the court should
Have dismissed this action based on the Summons and Complaint not being served within
The 120 days.
The court abused its discretion when it entered a default judgment against the
Defendant Ms. White, when many of the proper Rules of Civil Procedure have been
Violated in this action. Therefore, the court never obtained jurisdiction over defendant,
Ms. White because of improper service, process, and procedure.

Therefore, the court clearly abused its discretion by entering a default
Judgment against Ms. White, where the court did not have jurisdiction to enter
A default judgment against her. The court in Garcia v. Garcia^ 712 P.2d 288

11

Stated,
"The requirements of this rule relating to service of process are jurisdictional".
The court in the defendant cs Ms. White's case never obtained jurisdiction over
defendant, because of improper service and procedure, the record clearly reflects
this.
Therefore, this case must be dismissed and the defendant moves this court
To reverse the decision of the lower court.
POINT III
THE COURTS ABIUSE AND DISCRETION NOTWITHSTANDING UNRESOLVED
ISSUES AND FACT
There are numerous genuine issues and facts of material facts at issue in this case,
Which was required to be resolved before any Summary Judgment could be issued
In accordance with Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures as interpreted by
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc. 761 P2d 42 (Utah Ct. app. 1988).

In the Reconsidering the Motion for Granting the Summary Judgment there
Lists numerous issues that need to be resolved and heard before granting of the Summary
Judgment. The Reconsideration for Granting the Summary Judgment Motion has already
been made available to you who were included in the Docketing Statement.

12

POINT IV

PLAINTIFF AND COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURES AS
ESTABLISHED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

The Utah State Supreme Court has established procedures for which the
court, its officials and all attorneys or pro se litigants are required to perform when
litigating a case before the court. The court in turn is required to ensure that the
procedures are being adhered to, but they don't. The Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures clearly establish what a litigant is required to do.
The Utah Supreme court in Lucus v. Murray City (Civil Service
Commission). 949 P.2d 746 states,
"Any public entity who has rules, regulations or policies must comply with
them and the employee has a right to rely on them".
The court's by definition is a public entity. The court and the parties' have
procedures imposed upon them by the Utah Supreme Court by and through the
"Utah Rules of Civil Procedures'9. Rule 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly states,
"These rules shall govern the procedures in the courts of the State of Utah
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or
equity..."

13

Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures mandate that all
pleadings or other papers filed with the court must contain the specified
information as contained in the rule. In other cases the courts have ruled that if the
information as required buy the rule is missing it renders the pleading fatally
defective and the court fails to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant and the case
must be dismissed.
The court must impose and mandate upon the lower court that they and the
parties' must adhere to the procedures as they are mandated. The defendant
moves this court to impose the same standards as delineated in Lucas upon all
public and private entities alike and to impose that they must comply with the
policies, rules and procedures they establish and if they do not then they adversely
affected persons who can challenge the action.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the court records and dockets reflect everything that has
happened in this matter. The pleading fail to contain pertinent and necessary
information as outlined in Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, If the
information as required under the rule is missing it would render the summons,
complaint and its subsequent service fatally defective and the case must be
dismissed.
The court in Lucas, supra, mandated that any public entity that had rule
and policies must comply with those rules and policies. This would include the
courts. The court is a public entity and has rules and procedures called, "The
14

Utah Rule of Civil Procedures". The high court ruled that the public entity had to
comply with its rules, policies and procedures and the employee had a right to rely
on them. The defendant's position is that this case applies here. The court is a
public entity and a litigant has a right to rely on the rules, policies and procedures,
which apply to the court. They are required to comply all the time and the other
litigants have a right to rely on those rules, policies and procedures.
The court was provided a copy of the Reconsideration of the Summary
Judgment Motion. In accordance with Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures this case should have had the opportunity to be heard as interpreted by
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc. 761 P2d (Utah Cy. App. 1988).
These issues were never heard and under these grounds there should be an
immediate dismissal.
Because the plaintiff failed to ensure that the required information was
contained in the summons and/or complaint the defendant's right under
Article 1§ 7 of the United States Constitution and Article 14 of the United States
Constitution to due process. These requirements are necessary for any defendant
to properly defend the matter. Furthermore, because the court failed to ensure that
the defendant, Ms. White was properly served, violated her rights under Article 1 §
7 of the United State Constitutions and Article 14 of the United States
Constitution to due process. These requirements are necessary for any defendant
to properly defend, if it is not provided then one cannot be required to properly
defend the matter.
15

Therefore, the court must rule that the summons and/ or complaint have
pertinent information, which is mandatory under the rules and governing the time
allowed tofilethe written notice with the courts, and the rules pertaining to the
amount of time allowed tofilean Answers and Complaints within a decent time
frame, even if it is not within the time allowed by the courts, not 9 months when it
should have been within 120 days. All of these issues brought before the court
makes the service fatally defective. The defendant also believes that the court
should make the provisions as outline in Lucas applicable to all entities, public or
private. The defendant npves the court to dismiss this action.
Dated this E day of April 2003.
Respectfttfly Submitted,

±J?
tena White
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I certify that on this 1st day of April 2003,1 personally placed a true and correct copy of
the "Appellant Brief', in a sealed envelope. I further placed the same in the United States Postal
Service and addressed it to the following:
Jeremy M. Hoffman
Young, Adams & Hoffman, LLP
170SouthMain Street, Suite 1025
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1654

Signature
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CALLAHAN v. SHEAFFER
Cite as 877 P.2d 1259 (UtahApp. 1994)
OH 535 (Utah 199S;; Beck v. Fanners Ins.
Exch , 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985); Campbell v State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
g40 P.2d 130, 137 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
S53 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992); accord Heredia,
279 Cal.Rptr. at 518 (the duty to defend ends
with the policy limits, assuming no prejudice
attaches to the insured); Johnson, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 417 & insurer tenders its policy
limits in response to the demand of its insured prior to the initiation of litigation arising from an accident, insurer generally has
no further duty to defend); Kantack v. Progressive Ins. Co., 618 So.2d 494, 497 (La.Ct.
App. 1993) (an insurer must make every effort to avoid prejudicing its insured by the
timing of its withdrawal).

In this case, Fanners paid the policy limit
of $500 to Simmons before any action was
brought by Clayson. In fact, Farmers paid
the policy limit within twelve days after receiving Simmons's demand for payment.
Clayson's suit was filed ten months after
Simmons received payment. See Johnson,
248 Cal.Rptr. at 417 (stating that because
insurer paid policy limits within two weeks of
insured's demands and litigation began some
six months thereafter, court found no further
duty to defend). Farmers did not abandon
Simmons mid-course in litigation, and Simmons suffered no prejudice because Farmers
refused to defend her. Having paid the limits of liability in settlement of her claim,
Farmers's duty to defend Simmons came to
an end.
Duty of Good Faith

CONCLUSION
Simmons's appeal was from a final appealable order, thus we have jurisdiction to hear
this appeal. The trial court properly determined the insurance policy provided $500
collision coverage for damage to the horse
trailer. Further, the trial court also properly
refused to require Farmers to defend Simmons against Clayson's suit because it had
already paid the policy limits to Simmons.
We do not address the issues concerning
Farmers's duty of good faith and fair dealing
because they were not raised below. Accordingly, we affirm.
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ„ concur.

i | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

^

Geraldine CALLAHAN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.

John D. SHEAFFER, Jr., and Dart,
Adamson & Kasting, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 930518-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Julv 1. 1994.

Client brought legal malpractice action
against
attorney and law firm. The Third
[10] Simmons also asserts that Farmers
District
Court, Salt Lake County, Leslie A.
breached the constructive duty of good faith
Lewis,
J.,
entered summary judgment for
and fair dealing when it issued her an insurattorney
and
firm, and client appealed. The
ance pohc\ with a $500 deductible on a car
v
Court
of
Appeals,
Jackson, J., held that
alued at $350 and when it failed to defend
Simmon* in the suit brought by Claj'son. client's prior legal malpractice action "failed'*
because these issues were not raised below, within meaning of savings statute when it
^ e will not consider them on appeal. See was dismissed without prejudice by trial
°»gl»ri (U.S.A.) Inc. v 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 court for failure to sen e summons and comp
-2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Smith v. Iversen, plaint within 120 days of filing, rather than
*& P.2d 677, 677 (Utah 1993;; Wade v. upon expiration of 120-day period and, thus,
*taH'l 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App.1994); Jen- her action, filed within one year of dismissal,
klll!
> *-• Weis. 868 P.2d 1374. 1380 (Utah was timely
ApD.iaq^
•'oTov^nr' and remanded.
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1. Appeal and Error <£=>842(2)
As summary judgment, by definition, decides only questions of law, Court of Appeals
reviews trial court's conclusions for correctness.

Lynn P. Heward, Salt Lake Citt, for appellant.

2. Appeal and Error c=>863
Court of Appeals gives no deference to
trial court's determination of issues on summary judgment.

Before BENCH, JACKSON and GARFF,1
JJ.

3. Limitation of Actions C=>95(11)
/
Statute of limitations for legal malprac/ tice begins to run when alleged act of legal
/ malpractice is discovered or, in exercise of
/ reasonable care, should have been discovered. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.
\(
|
I
!
'

4> Limitation of Actions c=>130(9)
For purposes of savings statute, client's
initial legal malpractice action "failed" when
it was dismissed without prejudice by trial
court for failure to serve summons and complaint within 120 days of filing, rather than
upon expiration of 120-day period 155 days
before dismissal, and, thus, her action, filed
within one year of dismissal, was timely:
dismissal for failure to timely serve summons
and complaint was not automatic, but, rather,
depended upon application of party or trial
court's own initiative, and possibility existed
that client could have preserved initial action
even after she failed to make timely service.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 4(b), 6(b); U.C.A.
1953, 78-12-25. 78-12-40.
See publication Woids and Phiases
for othei judicial constructions and definitions

5. Pretrial Procedure c=>560
Failure of cause of action for failure to
serve summons and complaint within 120
days of filing is not automatic; dismissal
depends upon application of any party or
upon court's own initiative, and, unless and
until dismissal, party may preserve action
under proper circumstances as trial court
may enlarge time for service if appropriate
motion is made and failure was result of
excusable neglect. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules
4(b), 6(b).
1. Senior Judge Regnal W Garff, acting pursuant
to appointment under Utah Code Ann § 78-3-

Michael F. Skolnick and Carman E. Kipp.
Salt Lake City, for appellee.

OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Plaintiff Geraldine Callahan appeals the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants. We reverse.
FACTS
Callahan retained attorney John Sheaffer
to represent her in a divorce proceeding that
commenced in April 1987. She urged Sheaffer to take the necessary steps to preserve
her rights under her husband's retirement
plan. On January 21, 1988, Callahan discovered that her husband irrevocably changed
his beneficiary designation under the plan,
thereby eliminating Callahan's survivor interest. On July 26, 1991, Callahan filed a legal
malpractice suit against Sheaffer and his law
firm. The trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice on January 27, 1992,
for failure to serve a summons within 120
days of the filing as required by Rule 4(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On May
21, 1992, Callahan filed another malpractice
suit against Sheaffer and his law firm. The
court, however, ruled that the statute of limitationb had run and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Callahan appeals the summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
[1,2] Because summary judgment, by
definition, decides only questions of law. we
review the trial court's conclusions for correctness. EC A Health Sews. v. St Mcuk'b
Chanties, 846 P.2d 476, 481 (Utah App.199:]).
We give no deference to the trial court'*
24(10) (1992J
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determination of issues on summary judgment. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855
p.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
[3] This case requires us to determine
the applicability of the savings statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1992), to the statute
of limitations on a legal malpractice action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1992) allows
four years in which to bring an action for
legal malpractice. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778
P.2d 16, 18 (Utah App.1989). The statute of
limitations begins to run when the alleged act
of legal malpractice is discovered, or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have been
discovered. Id. at 18-19. The savings statute states:
If any action is commenced within due
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of
action survives, his representatives, may
commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1992). Thus, to
resolve the matter before us, we must determine when the statute of limitations began to
run, when Callahan commenced her cause of
action, when her cause of action "failed," and
when she commenced her new action.
[4] It is undisputed that on January 21,
1988, Callahan discovered the alleged negligence that prompted her to file a legal malpractice suit. Under Merkley, this is when
the statute of limitations on her action began
to run. M*rkley, 778 P.2d at 18-19. It is
also undisputed that on July 26, 1991, Callahan commenced her legal malpractice action
hy filing a complaint with the trial court.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that when a civil complaint is
filed with the court,
2

- This holding is supported by Luke v Benmon,
36 Utah 61, 106 P. 712 (Utah 1908) The Luke
court anaK/ed the application of a savings statute with urtually identical language to the one at
i^bue toda\. The Luke court cited a Georgia case
m which sen ice of process was required within
-0 davs of declaring a cause of action. Service
was not umclv, and the issue in the case was

the summons together with a copy of the
complaint shall be served no later than 120
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served,
the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any paiiy or upon
the court's oivn initiative.
Utah R.Civ.P. 4(b) (emphasis added). Callahan did not serve the summons and complaint within the 120 days. Approximately
155 days later, on January 27, 1992, the court
dismissed the complaint. Thus, the question
before us is whether Callahan's cause of action "failed" in late November 1991 when the
120 days expired, or on January 27, 1992,
when the court dismissed the complaint. We
hold that Callahan's cause of action failed on
January 27,1992, the day the court dismissed
it.
[5] Rule 4(b) has undergone several
changes since it came into effect. A change
of some significance to this case occurred
when Rule 4 was amended to acid language
stating that a cause of action was "deemed
dismissed" for failure to serve a summons
within the mandated period of time. At the
time of the case before us, the "deemed
dismissed" language had been removed from
the rule. The relevance of this change is
that for the time peiiod when an action was
"deemed dismissed" for lack of proper service, failure of a cause of action for savings
statute purposes was automatic under Rule
4(b). The "deemed dismissed" language
meant that once the time period for service
of summons elapsed, no further action was
necessary for the cause of action to be dismissed. Before the "deemed dismissed" language was added to Rule 4(b), and as wre hold
today, after the "deemed dismissed" language w^as removed from Rule 4(b), failure of
a cause of action under Rule 4(b) is not
automatic.2 As Rule 4(b) states, dismissal of
whether the impioper service of process "was
not onh ground for dismissing the suit, but ipso
facto terminated the action." Id 106 P. at 71314 The Luke court, referring to the Georgia
case, stated, "the suit 'did not come to termination the moment the time expired within
which the clerk might have annexed a process to
the petition. Vve think that the suit did not come
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the cadbe uf action after the time for service
of a summons has elapsed depends upon
some action, namely, the "application of any
party or upon the court's own initiative."
Utah R.Civ.P. 4(b). In the case before us,
such action was not taken until January 27,
1992, when the court, apparently on its own
initiative, dismissed the complaint.
Defendants argue that "the savings statute
does not hinge on dismissal of an action, but
rather upon failure of an action." They argue further that Callahan's complaint "failed"
after the 120-day period for service of a
summons expired. We disagree. Rule 6(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the trial court discretion to enlarge the time
allowed for service of summons or other actions, even after the prescribed time for such
action has expired, if the appropriate motion
is made and if the failure was the result of
excusable neglect. Thus, unless and until a
cause of action is dismissed, a party who fails
to serve a summons in a timely fashion may
preserve the action under proper circumstances. Because the possibility existed that
Callahan's cause of action might have been
preserved even after she failed to serve the
summons within the prescribed 120 days, her
cause of action was alive until the court
dismissed it on January 27, 1992. This is the
date when her cause of action "failed." Callahan commenced her new action against defendants for legal malpractice on May 21,
1992.

had expired prevented invocation of saving
statute). In this case, the four-year statute
of limitation on Callahan's legal malpractice
action began to run on January 21. 19Sb
Callahan commenced her cause of action on
July 26. 1991, before the statute of limitations expired. Her cause of action failed on
January 27, 1992, when the trial court affnmatively dismissed it. Thus, under the sa\ings statute, Callahan had until January 26.
1993, to renew her cause of action. Callahan
commenced her action on May 21, 1992, well
within the allotted time. Accordingly, the
trial court improperly granted summary
judgment m favor of defendants on the
ground that Callahan's action was untimely.
Thus, we reverse the trial court's order
granting summary judgment and remand
this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.
BENCH and GARFF. JJ.. concur.
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Janet R. COX (Rex), Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.

We now turn our attention to the applicaK. Norman COX, Defendant
tion of the savings statute. The savings
and Appellee.
statute "permits a plaintiff whose action has
No. 920818-CA.
been dismissed on non-substantive grounds
to file a new complaint within one year of the
Court of Appeals of Utah.
date of dismissal, if the dismissal has occurred after the statute of limitations for
July 5, 1994.
plaintiffs action has run." Moffitt v Baw,
837 P.2d 572, 573 (Utah App.1992); see also
Hansen v. Depcnimeat of Fin. Inst, Sob P.2d
Decree of divorce was entered by the
184, 187 (Utah App.1993) (noting failure of a Fourth District Court, Utah County, Lynn
cause of action before statute of limitations W. Davis, J., and wife appealed. The Court
to a tciminauon until the court, on the motion of
the defendant m the suit, dismissed it ' " Id 106
P at 714 (quoting W\nn \ BooLei, 22 Ga 359
(1857)) In Ashutli \ Elh±, 85 Utah 103, 38
P2d 757 759 (1935), the Ltah Supreme Court
stated that an action is pending, ' not onh until
the plaintiff has failed to serve a summons within
one \ear thereafter,
or within a reasonable

time, or until he has otherwise tailed to pio^ccute the action with due diligence, but until
something is done to put it out of court
hi
Although the court was not referring specificaih
to the Ltah rule requiring service of summon* n
is clear that the Ltah Supreme Court requned
some action to dismiss, or 'put a cause of action
out of court
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court, and on February 25, 1985, Judge
Wilkinson signed a notice stating that "if
the appeal is not perfected by the 29th of
March, 1985, then this notice shall serve as
a dismissal of the appeal with prejudice byorder of the Court." J On April 1, 1985, by
minute entry, Judge Wilkinson dismissed
the case and remanded it to circuit court
for disposition of sentence. Also on April
1, 1985, Judge Fishier signed an order
granting defendant a fourteen-day extension for filing a brief. Thereafter, on April
22, 1985, Judge Wilkinson signed yet another order dismissing the appeal.
From the foregoing facts, it would appear that defendant's appeal was properly
dismissed at the district court level. However, we do not reach the merits of that
decision in view of jurisdictional limitations
on our review of cases which originate in
circuit court. We have consistently held
that under U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3-5, decisions of the district court on appeal from
circuit courts are final except in cases involving a constitutional issue. State v.
Taylor, Utah, 664 P.2d 439 (1983).
Before this Court, defendant urges that
Judge Wilkinson's order of April 1, 1985,
conflicted with the extension granted by
Judge Fishier on the same date. Defendant claims that the motion for extension
was submitted on March 29, 1985, and that
the entry of conflicting orders on April I
1985, was due to a mistake on the part of
the court clerk. In so claiming, defendant
has not raised a constitutional issue.
The appeal to this Court is therefore
dismissed.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
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The deficiencies noted included failure to file
a transcript and failure to file a statement of

Lou Dean GARCIA, Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Charles William GARCIA, Defend
as*
and Appellant.
No. 19349.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 10, 1986.

Former husband petitioned to obaj
relief from operation of a divorce decr&
directing him to pay child support. %
Third District Court, Salt Lake Countr
Dennis Frederick, J., denied petition, a&
husband appealed. Following initial affirmance, rehearing was granted. The Supreme Court held that: (1) service of precess on husband at time that he was inca*
cerated in state prison, by leaving suitmons with prison officer, was ineffective;
SG that couri was without jurisdiction &
enter original decree of divorce, and (2i
petition filed some ten years after entry cf
decree was not too late.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Divorce <s=>78
Service cf process on prisoner by leading summons with prison officer was no;
valid under portion of Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
4(e)(1) permitting service by leaving copy at
defendant's usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion
"there residing."
2. Process <3=>58
Where service is on appointed agent.
agent must normally have been appoints
for the specific purpose of receiving Pr0*
cess, but agent may also be authorized b;«
law to receive service of process. Ru^?
Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(1).
points and authorities. By its term: tte ° r o e :
appcaro to be self-executing.
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£ process (S=>5S
Prison officer was not authorized
t for service of process on a prisoner.
JSLGV-PTOC..

Rule 4(e)(1).

Divorce <£=>65
fnal court was without jurisdiction to
decree of divorce where there was no
effective service of process. Pwules Civ.
Proc Rule 4(e)(1).
4

i Judgment «=»386«3)
Where judgment is void because of
fatally defective service of process, the
time "limitations of Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
60(b), relating to motion for relief from
judgment, have no application.
i Divorce <s=>308
Petition for relief from operation of
decree of divorce directing former husband
to pay child support, on ground that court
which entered decree lacked jurisdiction because there was no effective service of
process, was not too late even though filed
some ten years after entry of the decree.

Mary C. Corporan, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Lou Dean Garcia, Salt Lake City, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
This case is here on rehearing granted for
*e purpose of addressing the question of
jurisdiction. Appellant seeks reversal of an
wier of the trial court denying him relief
torn operation of a decree of divorce.
Jhe parties were married on October IT,
**8. On December 17, 1968, respondent
^ a child. Respondent sought and obtained a decree of divorce on March 14,
4V
'^ at a time when appellant was incar^ « j d m the Utah State Prison.1 The
^ault decree awarded custody of the child
Respondent and ordered appellant to pay
^ ° per month child supoort, beginning sixv
% s after his lease from prison.
Appellant was com icted of
^ a nd Ian er
• -\ m Ma} 1969.

burglary and

In January 1981, appellant was released
from prison. Appellant sought the services
of a lawyer in 1983 apparently after state
welfare recovery services sought to enforce the support obligation specified in the
decree of divorce. Counsel filed a "Motion
for Order of Relief from Judgment" and a
"Petition for Modification of Divorce Decree," both of which wrere denied by the
trial court. This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the divorce decree
should be set aside under Rule 60(b)2 since
he was not properly served with process.
The return of process, signed by a deputy
sheriff, states that appellant was served by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to "Mr. Johnson, head of State Prison personnel office.'' Appellant contends
that he never received a copy of the summons and complaint and that, in any event,
service upon a prison officer does not constitute effective service of process on a
prisoner.
Rule 4(e;(l) provides for personal service
as follows:
Upon a natural person of the age of 14
years or over, by delivering a copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such
copy at his usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion there residing; or by delivering a
copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process.
Under the foregoing rule, appellant could
ha\e been served by delivering a copy of
the summons to him personally. Case law
of other jurisdictions generally favors this
type of civil service of process on prisoners.
See White v. Underwood, 125 N.C. 25, 34
S.E. 104 (1899); Merchant's Administrator v. Shry, 116 Va. 437, 82 S.E. 106 (1914);
Steindler Paper Co. v. Charlevoix Circuit
Judge, 234 Mich. 288. 207 N.W. 896 (1926).
Appellant was not served in this manner in
the instant case.
[1] The rule also permits service "by
leaving such copy of his usual place of
2.

All references to Rules herein are to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion there residing/' Service was not
made under this provision since the summons was left with a prison officer who
clearly did not reside at appellant's usual
place of abode.3
[2,3] The final method by which process may be served under Rule 4(e)(1) is
"by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process." Where service is upon
an appointed agent, the requirements are
rather stringent: the agent must normally
have been appointed for the specific purpose of receiving process. See Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil § 1097. Appellant has appointed no
such agent in the instant case. An agent
may also be authorized by law to receive
service of process. Arguably, a county
sheriff or jailer might receive service of
process for prisoners in their custody under
U.C.A., 1953, § 17-22-6, but there is no
parallel statute covering persons incarcerated in the state prison. Appellant therefore has no authorized agent who could
receive service for him.
[4] Under the foregoing analysis, the
attempted service on appellant was fatally
defective. There being no effective service
of process, the court was without jurisdiction to enter the original decree of divorce.4
[5, 6] Although respondent has not filed
a brief in this matter, it might be argued
that appellant's motion to set aside the
decree is too late. Rule 60(b) provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party of his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
3. We need not decide whether appellant's "usual
place of abode" is his family residence or the
prison. For guidelines on this topic see 32 A.L.
R.3d 112, at § 16.
4. The requirements of Rule 4 relating to service
of process are jurisdictional. See Martin v. Nelson, Utah, 533 P.2d 897 (1975); Murdoch v.
Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971); Fibreboard Paper Products v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).

or proceeding for the following ^
. . . (4) when, for any cause, the s^
mons in an action has not been pero
ly served upon the defendant as ream J
by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has fa,C
to appear in said action: (5) the jud-nr^
is void; . . . . The motion shall ben^
within a reasonable time and for reason
(1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than thr*
months after the judgment, order, or p&
ceeding was entered or taken.
Under subsection (4), a party has osu
three months to challenge a judgmer;
where jurisdiction is obtained on construe,
tive service (pursuant to Rule 4(f)). s # ;
Moore's Federal Practice II 60.32; People i
One 1941 Chrysler, 81 Cal.App.2d 18,18
P.2d 368 (1947). Even under subsection (5
a void judgment seemingly must be challenged within a "reasonable time." Bui
where the judgment is void because of a
fatally defective service of process, the
time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no application. Woody i\ Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 240.
461 P.2d 465 (1969).
This is consistent with holdings under
the Federal Rules, after which our Rules
were patterned. As noted in Wright k
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil § 2862:
Rule 60(b)(4) [the equivalent to Utah
Rule 60(b)(5) ] authorizes relief from void
judgments.5 Necessarily a motion under
this part of the rule differs markedly
from motions under the other clauses o:
Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a
motion is under Rule 60(b)(4). Nor is
there any requirement, as there usually
is when default judgments are attacked
under Rule 60(b), that the moving party
show that he has a meritorious defense.
5. In a later paragraph in the cited reference, ••
is explained that a judgment is not void bccau^'
it is merely erroneous. A judgment is void on.
if the court that rendered it lacked juribdicticr
of the subject matter, or the parties, or u ••
acted in a manner inconsistent with due proce^
of law.
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^**r a judgment is void or it is valid,
f i n i n g which it is may well present
tffrolt question, but when that quests resolved, the court must act ac-

she appealed. The Supreme Court held
that the trial court's failure to instruct jury
on elements of "attempt'' was prejudicial
error.

Reversed and remanded.
Bf the same token, there is no time
^ on an attack on a judgment as void.
n* one-year [three-month, in Utah] limit
Lfeable to some Rule 60(b) motions is Criminal Law <3=»1173.2(2)
Sitasly inapplicable, and even the re- Robbery <3=>27(7)
Trial court's failure to instruct jury on
fltuiement that the motion be made within a "reasonable time," which seems lit- elements of ''attempt" in charge of atjnliy to apply to motions under Rule tempted robbery was prejudicial error.
0(bX4}> cannot be enforced with regard U.C.A.1953, 76-4-101, 76-6-301.
& this class of motion A void judgment
cannot acquire validity because of laches
« the part of the judgment debtor.
David M. Bown, Salt Lake City, for deBeeause we have concluded that the trial
fendant
and appellant.
ssrt had no jurisdiction to enter the dim e decree in the first instance, the order
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
buying relief from judgment must be, and City, for plaintiff and respondent.
» reversed. The case is remanded for
dttrj of judgment vacating the decree of
PER CURIAM:
korce because of the ineffective service
Defendant was convicted by a jury of
*( process In view of our holding that the
toee k void for lack of jurisdiction, we attempted robbery in violation of U.C.A.,
aed not address points raised in the peri- 1953, §§ 76-6-301 and 76-4-101. She appeals, citing as her single issue error by the
l s for modification
court in refusing her proffered instruction
So costs awarded
on the elements of attempt. We reverse.
(o
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

=*wma Maurine HARMON aka Shauna
Johnson, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20358,
Supreme Court «f Utan.
^ n 14 1936.

^ d n n d a n t *ab Conucted before the
District Court, Weber County, John
? Hu.bt, j 0 a:t H^pt c a roboery and

Defendant was charged by information
with robbery, but at the trial, the court
granted the State's motion to instruct the
jury on the lesser included offense of attempted robbery. In its instructions to the
jury, however, the court merely inserted
the word "attempted" before the word
''robbery" in the previously prepared instruction en the elements of the robbery
and read it to the jury as an instruction on
the elements of attempted robbery. As a
result, the court failed to instruct the jury
on the specific elements of attempt contained in U.C.A., 1953, § 76-4-10L Specifically, the court failed to instruct that in
order to convict of attempted robbery the
jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that defendant's conduct constituted a
"substantial step" toward commission of
the offense and tnar the substantial s*er:

WASATCH LIVESTOCK LOAN CO. v. DISTRICT COURT
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WASATCH LIVESTOCK LOAN CO. V. DISTRICT COURT !N AND FOR
UINTAH COUNTY et al.

No. 5576.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 14, 1935.
S. Process <§=»34

omits to state whether a complaint had already been filed or whether one would
thereafter be filed, thereby wholly failing
to indicate and to advise the defendant
therein how the action had been commenced, whether by service of summons or
by filing a complaint.
The defendant
therein appeared specially and moved to
quash the summons. This motion was denied by the trial court.

Summons served on defendant in district court action held fatally defective for
[1,2] The statute requires that a sumfailure to allege that complaint had been filed mons shall indicate by its contents the manwith clerk of court or that complaint would ner in which the action is commenced. By
be filed with clerk within ten days (Rev. St. R. S. Utah 1933, 104-5-1, an action may
1933, 104-5-1, 104-5-2).i
be commenced either by the filing of a
complaint with the clerk of the court in
2. Certiorari <§»36
Defendant in district court action who which the action is brought, or by service
was served with fatally defective summons of summons. By section 104-5-2 the apand whose motion to quash summons and propriate language to be used in either
service thereof was denied held entitled to case is specified; that is, the summons
relief by certiorari in Supreme Court.2
must indicate the precise manner in which
the action is commenced by stating in express words "which has been filed with the
Proceeding by the Wasatch Livestock clerk of said court," if the action be comLoan Company against the District Court menced by the filing of a complaint, or
of the Fourth Judicial District in and for "which, within ten days after service of
Uintah County, and others, for writ of this summons upon you. will be filed wTith
certiorari to review an order denying a the clerk of said court," if commenced by
motion to quash the summons in an ac- service of summons. The summons served
tion brought by the defendant Annie Bow- on defendant in the district court action
den, as administratrix of the estate of Jo- failed to state either alternative, and was
seph H. Bowden, deceased, against the Wa- therefore
fatally defective.
Farmers'
satch Livestock Loan Company.
Banking Co. v. Eullen, 62 Utah, 1, 217 P.
Order annulled, and District Court re- 969. Plaintiff is entitled to relief in this
strained from taking further proceedings. court. Glassmann v. Second District Court,
80 Utah, 1, 12 P. (2d) 361.
Thomas & Thomas, of Salt Lake City,
On the record in this case the court befor plaintiff.
low should have quashed and set aside the
Ray E. Dillman, of Roosevelt, for de- summons and the alleged service thereof.
fendants.
The order of the district court of Uintah
county denying the motion to quash and
FOLLAND, Justice.
requiring the defendant to answer within
A writ of certiorari was issued to re- ten days is annulled, and the defendant disview an order of the district court of Uin- trict court and the judges thereof are retah county denying plaintiff's motion to strained from further proceeding in the
quash summons and service thereof in an cause of Annie Bowden, as Administraaction brought by the defendant Annie trix of the Estate of Joseph H. Bowden,
Bowden, as administratrix of the estate of Deceased v. Wasatch Livestock Loan ComJoseph H. Bowden, deceased, against Wa- pany, until such time as jurisdiction of
satch Livestock Loan Company. Plaintiff said defendant is conferred upon that
filed a brief in support of its petition. De- court. Costs are awarded to plaintiff herefendant filed no brief but has submitted in against individual defendants.
the cause without brief or argument. The
record in the case from the district court
ELIAS
HANSEN,
C
J.,
and
is now before us. The summons served E P H R A I M HANSON, M O F F A T , and
on defendant in the district court case W O L F E , JJ., concur.
1
Farmers' Banking Co. y. Bullen, 62
Utah, l, 217 P. 909.

2

Glassmann v. Second District Court,
80 Utah, 1,12 P. (2d) 36L

LOCKE v. 'ETERSON

Utah

im

Cite a s 28! P . 2 d l l l l

represented to the court that such was sig3 Utah 2d 415
Whitland T. LOCKE, Ralph O. Williams and nature of defendant, rule which provides
Hayne L. Jarrard, Plaintiffs and
that within five days after service of procRespondents,
ess, proof of service shall be made by written
admission or waiver of service by perv.
son
to
be served, duly acknowledged or othL. R. PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
erwise
proved, was satisfied. Rules of Civil
No. 8329.
Procedure, rule 4 ( g ) .
Supreme Court of Utah.
4. Process €=524
July 15, 1955.
Where copy of summons left with defendant was not true copy of original and
Motion to set aside default judgment. did not state whether complaint had alThe Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun- ready been filed with clerk of court or
ty, Clarence E. Baker, J., refused to set whether such filing was to be made in fuaside default judgment, and petitioner ap- ture, defendant was entitled to rely on his
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J., copy for such information, and as his copy
held that where copy of summons left with of summons failed to make definite statedefendant after he was served with original ment regarding filing, it was fatally defecwas not exact copy of original and was de- tive and jurisdiction of person served was
fective and would not have conferred ju- not conferred. Rules of Civil Procedure,
risdiction, and original copy filed with clerk rule 4(g).
was proper and would have conferred jurisdiction, situation created sufficient con- 5. Judgment <S=I38(3)
Where copy of summons left with defusion that motion to set aside default and
fendant
after he was served with original
judgment against defendant should have
was not exact copy of original and was debeen granted.
fective and would not have conferred juJudgment reversed and cause remandrisdiction, and original copy filed with clerk
ed with directions to set aside default and
was proper and would have conferred juproceed to trial on merits.
risdiction, situation created sufficient confusion that motion to set aside default and
1. Judgment <§=>124
judgment against defendant should have
Rule which provides that within five been granted. Rules of Civil Procedure,
days after service of process, proof there- rule 4(g).
of shall be made by written admission or
waiver of service by person to be served, 6. Judgment C=M35
In case of uncertainty, default judgduly acknowledged or otherwise proved, is
ments
should be set aside to allow trial on
purposed to safeguard against entering de1
fault judgment against persons except merits.
where it satisfactorily appears that they
have consented thereto. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 4(g).
2. Process C=M49

Any proof which sufficiently establishes that written admission or waiver of
service of process has been made is sufficient if so regarded by tli2 court. Rules of
Cn ll Procedure, rule 4(g).

Grant Macfarlane, Max G. Halliday, Salt
Lake G t \ , for appellant.
Earl D. Tanner, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

WADE, Justice.
This is an appeal by L. R. Peterson, defendant, from the trial court's re Tubal to
set aside a default judgment. On August
3. Process C=149
26, 1951, Earl D. Tanner, attorney for
Where attorney delivered process, and plaintiffs Whitland T. Locke, Ralph 0 .
defendant signed original copy of sum- Williams and H a \ n e L Jarrard, respondmons m presence of attorney, and it was ents here, handed to defendant a summons
!. L>ah Commercial & Savings Bank v T*u~,bo, 17 Utah 1SS, 53 P. 1033
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and purported copy thereof requesting him
to sign the following statement which was
typewritten on the front of both the original
and the copy
"Receipt of this summons is acknowledged this 26th day of August,
1954, and service of the same is accepted
"L R Peterson"
Peterson signed both the original and the
purported copy, the original he returned
to Tanner and retained the purported copy
The original contained the following provision
"You are herebv summoned and
required to serve upon Anderson,
Taylor and Tanner, Plaintiff's attorneys * * * an answer to the complaint within 20 days after service of
this summons" upon you If you fail
so to do, judgment by default will be
taken against vou for trie relief demanded in said complaint, vXK&KYKXX

which, within 10 days after service of
this summons upon you will be filed t
with the clerk of the above c o u r t "
The above part which is crossed out was
crossed out m the original summons but
was not crossed out in the cop} so that part
of the cop} read as follows
«* * *
for the relief demanded m said complaint,
which has been filed with the clerk of said
court, and a copv of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon vou (or)*
which, \\ithm 10 days after service ot t h ^
summons upon you will be filed with tm
clerk of the above court"
Plaintiffs' attorne} duly filed the original
summons with the required copies of the
complaint with the clerk of the court and
defendant failed to appear and his default
a^d de^a It judsm^nt v ere entered a2:1 n^t
him on October 6, 1954 On Januarv -t-,
19"5 appellant served notice of h s i^te^tion to move t i e COL rt to c et 2< cL th- c tault 1 dgiit u
Tvvo proT lens are p~ scnted 1 D ^ the pioot of serv ie c*
Sdivuro"'s r°ect the req1 it-err>e^ts ot +--e
Lt?a Ru c^ oi Cnd
P~occdd~e~
T

Should the court have set the default and
judgment aside and allowed him to answer
on the merits ? We consider these problems in the above order
1 Rule 4(g) of U R C P provide^ that:
"Within 5 days after service of process
proot thereof shall be made as follows
*
*
*
*
*
*
"(4) By the written admission or waiver
of service bv the person to be served, dulv
acknowledged, or otherwise pro\ ed "
[1-3] I t is undoubtedly true that this
requirement is purposed to safeguard
against entering the default of persons except where it satisfactorily appears that
they have consented thereto
Assuming
that the term "duly acknowledged" requires
acknowledgement before a notary public
or other officer entitled to administer oaths,
the related phrase used m the same context
"otherwise proved" also imports some
proof upon which the court mav safelv conclude that the appearance is genuine Subdivision (4) deals onh with the manner of
proof of a "written admission or waiver of
service b\ the person to be served" It has
nothing to do with the manner ot proot of
other kinds of service mentioned in Subdivisions (1), (2) or (3) as contended bv*
defendant
Any proof which sufhcientlv
establishes that a written admission or
waiver of service has been made is sufficient if so regarded bv the court
Here
i-he detendan f signed trie statement m the
presence of the attornev, who is an officer
o~ the court, m whom the court can properly repose confidence, and who in turn
represented to the court that such was the
signature of the defendant That v c.s unqae^tionablv sufficient proof to satisfv the
requirements of the above rule.
[4] 2 On the second point we conclude that the court should have c et the default and judgment aside and allowed the
deierdant to answer on the men's The
coov of the summons which wa^ i<~ t wi 1
t1 e detendant was not a true coov ot t i e
^ - a l ard did not stite vvh ther t e
c o r r cunt r r d al r eadv been filed with t i e
cieriv ot the coart or whether c a c i n r g
was to be made in the tuture Th s cOn~t
* a a+ leacf +wice held Viit where tie * ~>
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mons failed to make a definite statement of
that fact it was fatally defective arid did
not confer upon the court jurisdiction of
the person served. 1 In this case the original summons did- make such a statement
hut the copy left with the defendant merely
stated that the complaint had been filed or
would within 10 days be filed* The copy
left with the defendant is the instrument
on which he was entitled to rely for such
information.
[5,6] Thus we have filed a proper
•summons, receipt of which is accepted
which conferred jurisdiction of the defendant on the court. However if a true copy
of the summons which was left with the
defendant had been filed it would have been
defective and would not have conferred
jurisdiction. This situation created sufficient con fusion' that the motion to set aside
the default and judgment against the defendant should have been granted and he
-should have been allowed to plead consistent with our declared policy that in case
of uncertainty, default judgments should
be set aside to allow trial on the merits. 2
Reversed and remanded with directions
to set aside the default and the judgment
against the defendant and to allow him to
file his answer on the merits and proceed to
trial. Costs to the appellant.
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT,
J., concur.
W O R T H E N , J., concurs in result
H E N R I O D , Justice (concurring in result).
I concur in the result and agree with the
principle enunciated by Mr. Justice W A D E
to the effect that a signed statement admitting service of process satisfies Rule 4
(g) (the signer thus submitting himself to
J. See Wasatch Livestock Loan Co. v.
District Court in and for Uintah County,
SG Utah 422, 46 P.2d 309; Fanners'
Banking Co. v. Bullen, 62 Utah 1, 217
P. 939.
233 P 2J

70 1 2

the court's jurisdiction), but I cannot concuf with the reasons assigned by the main
opinion why the judgment should have been
vacated. ~
The only determinative point on appeal is
whether or not defendant should have been
relieved of a default judgment because of
excusable neglect. The main opinion says
the judgment should have been set aside
because the copy of the summons received
by defendant was not a true copy in that it
did not advise whether a complaint had
been filed or would be filed within ten days.
I cannot see how this circumstance possibly
could be ground for vacating the judgment
on the basis of excusable neglect, since, at
the worst, defendant could assume only that
the complaint would be filed within ten days
and it would be a simple matter to check to
determine if the filing had been made
within that time, after which the defendant would have ten days to plead if it had
been filed. Failure to make such inquiry
hardly could be said to be excusable neglect.
However, it appears that the copy of the
summons bore a case number different from
that on the complaint and court records,
that the defendant left the state the day
after he was served, and that he took steps
to request the vacation of the judgment as
soon as he learned of it. The case number
on the summons was one that had been assigned to a case which touched the same
subject matter, but in which no action was
taken against defendant. Under such circumstances, defendant's failure to answer
easily could have been the result of excusable neglect under the Utah case cited by
the majority opinion,—a case somewhat
similar factually,—and such as to result in
an abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in failing to relieve the defendant of the default.
2. Utah Commercial & Savings Bin1* v.
Trumbo, 17 Utah IDS, 53 P. l(W:j.
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Norman BARBER and Helen Barber,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
The EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et
al., Defendants, Third-Party
Plaintiffs, and Appellants,
N. George DAINES and Daines &
Kane, Third-Party Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 880410.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 16, 1990.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1990.
Creditor sought renewed judgment
against debtor and debtor counterclaimed
alleging creditor failed to offset proceeds
of execution sale. Creditor added claim to
determine validity of execution sale and
debtor added third-party complaint against
creditor's attorney for abuse of legal system. The First District Court, Cache County, Venoy Christoffersen. J., renewed the
original judgment, dismissed debtor's counterclaim and third-parry' complaint, ordered
sanctions against debtor's attorney, and
noted that ruling on whether execution sale
proceeds would be applied to judgment
would be made later. Debtors appealed.
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that:
(1) renewal of judgment was not effective
against partnership or general partner who
were not served; (2) matters in debtor's
counterclaim and third-party complaint
could not be relitigated; and (3) attorney
sanctions were justified.

2. Partnership <s=>375
Service on limited partnership may be
obtained through service on general partner, but service must be directed to defendant partnership and intended as service on
partnership. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(5).
3. Partnership <S=>375
Service on partner as individual, but
not as agent or representative of partnership, brought in only individual and limited
partnership never became a party. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(5).
4. Judgment <s=>868(2)
Partnership <s»375
Failure to serve general partner who
was jointly, rather than jointly and severally, liable on debt precluded renewal of
judgment against him, but did not affect
renewal of judgment against two general
partners who were served. U.C.A.1953,
48-1-12.
5. Judgment <§=>720
Issues in counterclaim and third-party
complaint which had been disposed of in
previous final judgment could not be relitigated in action to renew judgment.
6. Attorney and Client <s=>24
Sanctions were warranted against attorney who persisted in pursuing and seeking remedies after all relevant legal issues
were settled and thus burdened adverse
party with expense of legal fees to answer
matters that had previously been adjudicated.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Raymond N. Malouf, Logan, for defendants, third-party plaintiffs and appellants.
N. George Daines, Logan, for third-party
defendants and appellees.
N. George Daines, Logan, pro se.

1- P>ankruptcy c=>2395
Action to renew judgment against
debtor does not violate automatic stay provision* of Bankruptcy Code; renewal is not
a
n attempt to enforce, collect, or expand
°ngmal judgment. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.
C A
- - § 362(a)(1).

DURHAM, Justice:
Appellants challenge a trial court order
renewing a judgment against them and dismissing their counterclaim and third-party
claim. They also challenge a judgment for
sanctions against their attorney. We affirm but vacate the renewal of the judgr.ent against Dor. White.
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This case has a long and tortured history. Appellees Norman and Helen Barber
originally filed a complaint in January
1979, seeking payment of a promissory
note executed by appellants Von Stocking
and Don White as general partners of The
Emporium Partnership, In a judgment
dated April 18, 1979, the trial court found
for the Barbers and ordered appellants to
pay the amount of the note plus interest.
Appellants challenged the enforceability of
that judgment in an appeal before the court
of appeals. Barber v. The Emporium
Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct.App.
1988). They specifically challenged the
award of post-judgment interest and attorney fees and the determination that the
partnership agreement did not preclude recovery. That appeal was dismissed because it was untimely. Id. at 203.
As of March 1987, appellants still had
not satisfied the judgment. The Barbers
filed a complaint at that time to renew the
judgment to avoid its lapse under the statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-22 (1987). After appellants' motion to dismiss was denied, they answered
the complaint and filed a counterclaim. In
their counterclaim, they alleged that the
Barbers failed to offset the judgment by
the value of property purchased by the
Barbers in an execution sale ($20,000).
The Barbers purchased residential property
in which they believed Raymond Malouf,
one of the appellants here and also appellants' attorney, had an interest. The purchase was an attempt to recover part of
their original judgment against Malouf, but
his interest in the property was later disputed.
The Barbers then amended their complaint to add two causes of action, making
the complaint for renewal their first cause
of action. Their second cause of action
included a request pursuant to rule 69(g)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for a
judicial determination of whetner the S20,1. The Barbers state in tneir brief that the\ are
willing to credit tnis amount toward the judgment if the execution sale is found to ce \alid
2. This amount included the principal plus ac
crued interest UD to Marc^ 2" 1Q87 Trie tna!

000 execution sale was valid.1 Upon answering the amended complaint, appellants
amended their counterclaim and added a
third-party complaint against the Barbers'
counsel for abuse of the legal system in
pursuing the Barbers' claims.
The Barbers moved for partial summary
judgment on their first cause of action and
for dismissal of appellants' counterclaim
and third-party complaint. They also
moved for sanctions against Raymond Malouf as appellants' attorney for continuing
to pursue settled issues. The trial court
granted the Barbers' motion for partial
summary judgment, dismissed the counterclaim and third-party complaint, and ordered Malouf to pay $3,000 in sanctions.
The trial judge renewed the onginal judgment, finding $40,884.96 the total amount
due.2 The judge held that the issues raised
in appellants' counterclaim and third-party
complaint had no basis in law or fact because they had been disposed of in the trial
court's previous rulings and the court of
appeals' decision. The judge also noted
that a later ruling would be made pursuant
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69(g)(2) as
to whether the Barbers' bid on the Malouf
interest in the residential property should
be counted as a partial satisfaction of the
judgment.
Appellants argue that renewal of the
judgment against the partnership violated
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(1), because the partnership was in
bankruptcy when the action was initiated.
This section provides an automatic stay for
the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or
other proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the
ccmmencement ot the case under this
title.
judge's order also allowed tor interest that
would accrue from the date of tne oider The
trial judge subtracted from the total due an
interest pavment of- S866.47 made b> appellants
on December 3i, 1984
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The purpose of the automatic stay is to
"protect the debtor from his creditors" by
providing relief from collection proceedings
which would "impair the debtor's ability to
successfully reorganize under Chapter 11
and to fairly meet outstanding obligations
to all creditors/' Rogers v. Rogers, 671
P.2d 160, 164 (Utah 1983); see also Utah
Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Labrum, 762
P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988) (construing the automatic stay provisions in a case affirming an
order finding attorney Raymond Malouf—
coincidentally an appellant and attorney in
this case—in contempt of court for unlawfully converting funds).
Although this court has never addressed
the question of whether the automatic stay
provisions apply to renewal of a judgment,
there is other pertinent authority. The
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recently held that the automatic stay provisions do not "prohibit acts
to extend, continue, or renew otherwise
valid statutory liens." The court explained
its holding:
Action by a lienholder [to extend a lien]
does not result in an enlargement of the
lien, nor does it threaten property of the
estate which would otherwise be available to general creditors. To the contrary, extension under [the New York
statute] simply allows the holder of a
valid lien to maintain the status quo—a t
policy not adverse to bankruptcy law, but
rather in complete harmony with it.
In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.
1989).
State courts similarly have interpreted
the automatic stay provisions. In Marine
Midland Bank v. Herriott 10 Mass.App.
?43, 412 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Mass.App.Ct.
1980). the Massachusetts Appeals Court
held that where "the focus of the suit [in
the non-bankruptcy court] is relief other
than the actual collection of a debt, the
judicial proceeding need not be stayed because the order of [that] court will not
interfere with the bankruptcy proceedings." The California Coart of Appeal res' Of course, e\en if the Barbers' action against
the partnership had been automatically stayed,
the renewal judgments against tne partners
^ouic not ha\e been affected.

lied on this language in Barnett v. Lewis,
170 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1088, 217 Cal.Rptr.
80, 85 (Cal.Ct.App.1985). noting that the
automatic stay would not apply to an "action to renew a judgment [because it]
would not have been a direct attempt to
collect"
[1] An action to renew a judgment does
not violate the automatic stay provisions of
the bankruptcy code. A renewal is not an
attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the
original judgment. When the Barbers
sought to renew their judgment against
The Emporium Partnership, they were only
trying to maintain the status quo by preventing the judgment's lapse under the
statute of limitations. The original judgment against the partnership was final before the partnership went into bankruptcy.
Renewing the judgment did not affect the
partnership's assets or its ability to fairly
deal with all its creditors and therefore was
not automatically stayed.3
[2,3] Appellants also argue, however,
that renewal of the judgment as against
the partnership was improper because the
partnership was not served. Service on a
limited partnership may be obtained
through service on a general partner. See
Utah R.Civ.P. 4(e)(5); Summa Corp. v.
Lancer Industries, Inc., 577 P.2d 136, 137
(Utah 1978). However, the service must be
directed to the defendant partnership and
intended as service on the partnership.
Here, the summons and complaint were
served only on an individual defendant,
thereby bringing him in as a party. They
were not served on him as an agent or
representative of the partnership, and the
partnership therefore never became a party.
[4] Appellants challenge the renewal of
the judgment because Don White, one of
the general partners, was not served. It is
true that the judgment against White cannot be renewed without proper service on
him.1 Failure to serve White, however, has
4. The Barbers concede that the judgmen. is joint
rather than joint and several. Utah Code Ann.
§ 43-i_i2 U9S9,. Thu> means that each defen-
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tion, take action to that end. In acting
on its own motion, the court must proceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it
is manifest from the record that the
court's discretion has been abused. 1
We believe and hold that in the instant
case the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but on the contrary acted with
judicial propriety looking to the interests
of all litigants and in promoting their
causes with reasonable dispatch,—certainly
in preventing indiscriminate jostling and
clogging of court calendars. (Emphasis
supplied.)

another state was temporarily within county,
service of summons was invalid.
Affirmed.

1. Process €=153

Where sheriff's return showed that
summons was served on one defendant by
leaving copy of summons and complaint
with his wife but deputy sheriff at time
of service endorsed on copy left with wife
that it was served on another defendant who
although resident of another state was
temporarily within county, service of summons was invalid.
2. Judgment <§=>I53(I)

CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER,
TUCKETT and ELLETT, JJ., concur.

23 Utah 2d 249
Bill S. WOODY, dba Woody Drilling Company, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Bert RHODES and Vaughn Rhodes,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 11732.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 21, 1969.

Where service of summons was fatally
defective, judgment entered pursuant thereto was without force or effect and court
could properly set it aside even though motion to set aside default judgment was not
made within three months period as required by rules. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b).
3. Judgment <§=>I53(I)

Rule relating to filing motion to set
aside default judgment within three months
of entry of judgment has no application
where default judgment was entered after
invalid service of process. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 60(b).

Ted S. Perry, Logan, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard F. Gordon, Bngham City, for
The First District Court, Box Elder defendants-respondents.
-ounty, Lewis Jones, J., set aside a default
TUCKETT, Justice.
Judgment and plaintiff appealed. The SuTUGkett
hdd that Where
The plaintiff commenced this action in
E -nf ^^
> J"
return
showed that summons was the court below seeking to recover on a
^ e on one defendant by leaving copy promissory note and also on an oral consummons and complaint with his wife but tract to drill a well for the defendants.
lm
•Pwy
sheriff
^ service
C A - „ , ^ endorsed
—A~.~~A
Complaint was filed on February 15, 1968,
^
. l t t aatt tt,mp
e of
and the summons was served on February
W l t h % U f e t h a t lt W a S S e r v e d
n
another d "
°
Pendant who although resident of
20, 1968, by a deputy sheriff of Box Elder
I d a i j o ^ ; *** k m a n v. Beckman, 88
*. Hnrrls' , - x>>2d 8 1 ° (19G5 > : H a i ™
<***>. u
• :UZ i m r - 2 d 4 0 2
Co. oo, i 0 r n

v

- ^alifornin-Ora

TW„,«

Baker v. Sojka, 74 N.M. 587, 396 P.2d
195 (1964): 5 Moore's Fed.Prac, Sec.
41.11(2), 1114: Link v. Wabash R.R.
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County The sheriff's return shows that
the summons was served on the defendant
Vaughn Rhodes by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint with Mrs Vaughn
Rhodes, wife of the defendant
However,
the deputy shenfi at the time of service endorsed on the copy of the summons left
with Mrs Vaughn Rhodes the following*
'"Served this summons and complaint on the
withm named defendant Bert Rhodes on the
20th day of February, 1968, at Tremonton,
Box Elder County, U t a h " Bert Rhodes,
who was a resident of the State of Nevada,
was temporarily in Box Elder County,
Utah, and upon his return home he took the
copy of the complaint and summons with
him A judgment by default was entered
against the defendant Vaughn Rhodes en
April 2, 1968, and the action was dismissed
as against the defendant Bert Rhodes
Vaughn Rhodes learned of the default
judgment in Januar> of 1969, and thereafter in April of that year filed a motion
to set aside the default judgment The de
fendant also filed an answer and counterclaim
[1-3] After a hearing by the court, the
court vacated ana set aside the judgment
It is the plaintiff's contention here that the
provisions of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules oi
Civil Procedure, required that the detendant
file hies motion withm a period of not more
than three months after entry of the judgment It is quite apparent m this case that
the facts show an invalid service of summons 1 The endorsement upon the summons which indicated that the defendant
Bert Rhodes was being served would surely
tend to mislead the defendant Vaughn
Rhodes as to whether or not he was the person required to answer
The service of
summons being fatally defective, the judgment entered pursuant thereto i s without
force or effect and the court acted properly in setting it aside The three-months
provision prodded fo- in Rule 60(b) has
no application to this situation
i

Columbia Tiust Co v Stemei, 71 Ltaii

The plaintiff further contends that the
order of the court setting aside the judgment also dismissed his action W e do not
interpret the order of the court as goms;
that far. It appears that the defendant
having answered and filed his counterclaim
has now submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and the court can now
proceed to hear the case on its merits The
defendant and respondent here does not
claim that the plaintiff's complaint has
been dismissed
The order of the court below setting
aside the judgment by default is affirmed
and the case is remanded to that court for
further proceedings
The respondent is
entitled to costs
CROCKETT, C J , and CALLISTER
and H E N R I O B , J J , concur
ELLETT, J , concurs in the result.

23 Utah 2d 252
Ennis D. COVERT, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
a New York corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 11503.

Supicme Court of Utah
Nov 24, 1969

Action against husband's employer b}
widow to recover damages for emotional
distress allegedly resulting from the rau
tilation of her husband's body during at
tempt to remo\e him from feeder com
partment of ore crusher. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M
Hanson, J , dismissed action on dete^d
ant's motion fo r summary judgment a^c
Tax Commission v Larsen
10-* 110 POrt

^ft

100 LtJii
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Edward J. LUCAS, Petitioner,
v.
MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and Murray City
Corporation, Respondents.
No. 960803-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 28, 1997.
City police officer appealed from decision of the city civil service commission, affirming his termination. The Court of Appeals, Wilkins, Associate P.J., held that: (1)
commission violated police officer's due process rights by excluding from post-termination hearing evidence of retaliatory discharge; (2) substantial evidence failed to
support commission's finding that officer lied
about his gun's position, used to support
dishonesty charge; and (3) even assuming
officer was dishonest regarding placement of
his gun, termination was so disproportionate
to dishonesty charge that it amounted to
abuse of chiefs discretion.
Reversed.
Bench, J., concurred in result and filed
opinion.
1. Constitutional Law c=*277(2)
City police officer, as civil service employee, had property interest in continued
employment subject to due process protection; Utah statute grants civil service employees security against discharge without
cause. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 14; U.C.A.
1953,1C-3-1012.
2. Constitutional Law C=>277(1)
Property interests subject to due process protection are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from independent source
sucn as state law. U.S.CA. ConstAmend.
14.

must have more than abstract need, desir
unilateral expectation of it; she must 1
legitimate claim of entitlement to
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14.
4. Constitutional Law <£=>278.4(5)
Officers and Public Employees €=>7
If property interest in continued pi
employment exists, then public employe
entitled to procedures comporting with n
mum requirements of due process, as pre
ed in Constitution; however, if no prop
interest exists, then employee must rely s
ly upon any procedural protections affoi
by contract, ordinance, or state stat
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14.
5. Constitutional Law <®=>278.4(5)
Municipal Corporations ®=»185(4,6)
City police officer was entitled to
process by way of oral or written notic
charges, explanation of city's evidence,
portunity to respond to charges in somet
less than full evidentiary hearing before
mination, and full post-termination hearh
meaningful time, as provided in Utah sta
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; U.C.A1953
3-1012.
6. Constitutional Law <£=>278(1.1)
Essential principle of due process
quires that deprivation of any signii
property interest be preceded by notice
opportunity for hearing appropriate t(
ture of case. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14
7. Constitutional Law €=251.6
Post-deprivation procedures, while
constitutionally guaranteed, must cor
with due process requirements providin
fan- hearing. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 14
8. Officers and Public Employees c=
In disciplinary proceedings, public
must comply with its own rules and emp
beimc disciplined is entitled to rely
tnose riles.
9. Constitutional Law C=*27SJ<5>
Municipal Corporations c=>183<3*
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ment policy and completion of investigation
within 46 days did not give rise to due process violation per se, where, other than asserting delay, officer revealed nothing about
delay and failed to provide any evidence that
delay wras unreasonably prolonged. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
10. Constitutional Law ©=278.4(5)
Municipal Corporations <©=>185(6)
City police department complied with its
policy, requiring written notification to police
officer of allegations and rights and responsibilities relative to internal affairs investigation prior to investigation, and thus, due
process was not violated; although officer did
not receive written notice of either allegations of excessive force or dishonesty before
initial interview, officer had actual notice of
charges, was able to respond to them before
termination, received written notice of
charges before termination and failed to establish how these procedural errors were
harmful. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
11. Constitutional Law <3=>278.4(5)
Municipal Corporations <§=>185(9)
City civil service commission violated police officer's due process rights by excluding
from post-termination hearing evidence of
retaliatory discharge, where such evidence
directly related to credibility of two of three
witnesses upon whose testimony commission
relied in reaching its decision and witness'
credibility was directly relevant and material
to commission's fair evaluation of termination
decision made by one witness. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
11

Municipal Corporations <®=>185(9)
k City civil service commission's decision
S^t city'fe motion in limine without pro^ g any findings, conclusions, or reasoning
arbitrary and capricious, and thus, com°n abused its discretion in granting mo.deluding evidence of retaliatory dis^ e ° f police officer.
Adm

inistrative Law and Procedure
^485
^VWy's failure to make adequate finda
ct m material issues renders its
arbitrary and carjricious unless evi-

dence is clear, uncontroverted and capable of
only one conclusion.
14. Municipal Corporations <®=>218(8)
City civil service commission is local,
municipal tribunal of limited jurisdiction, not
subject to Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (UAPA) or bound by formal rules of
evidence and procedure. U.C.A.1953, 6346b-l et seq.
15. Municipal Corporations <s>218(8)
Although city civil service commission is
not bound by formal rules of evidence and
procedure, it is not above the law; in absence
of formal legal rules, commission must determine what evidence should, in fairness, be
admitted and evidence must be legally relevant, in that it has some probative weight
and reliability.
16. Appeal and Error <s>842(6)
Whether certain evidence is relevant is
question of law, which Court of Appeals reviews under correction-of-error standard.
17. Witnesses c=»363(l)
Testimony reflecting on bias and motives
of witness is admissible at trial.
18. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(12)
City civil service commission's error in
excluding from post-termination hearing evidence of retaliatory discharge in violation of
police officer's due process rights was not
harmless, where proffered evidence directly
related to credibility of two of three witnesses upon whose testimony commission
relied in reaching its decision and had commission heard such evidence, there was substantial likelihood of different outcome.
U.S.CA Const.Amend. 14.
19. Appeal and Error <S=>1050.1(1), 1056.1(1)
Erroneous decision to admit or exclude
evidence does not constitute reversible error
unless error is harmful.
20. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(12)
Although city civil service commission
may have erred in excluding from police
officer's post-termination hearing audiotape
of arrestee, which officer intended to use for
impeachment purposes, error was harmless,
where officer had i*cce>* rc> hnt full*A ^ . ~™^
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himself of other means available to impeach
arrestee.
21. Municipal Corporations <3=>185(8)
City civil service commission did not exceed its authority by either deferring to independent advisor's legal advice or acquiescing
to advisor's active participation in police officer's post-termination hearing, where ultimate responsibility for all these matters rested with commission and it was at liberty to
rely upon advice of its chosen legal advisor.
22. Officers and Public Employees <3=*72.31
City civil service commission's authority
on review of disciplinary decisions involves
inquiries as to whether facts support charges
made by department head, and, if so, whether charges warrant sanction imposed.
23. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(10)
Substantial evidence failed to support
city civil service commission's finding that
police officer lied about his gun's position,
used to support dishonesty charge; arrestee
gave inconsistent statements regarding
placement of gun and unsubstantiated allegations of excessive force, other officer stated
that he did not see gun pointed at arrestee,
and officer consistently maintained that he
perceived his gun to be holstered, but recognized possibility that it could have been unholstered and pointed at floor.
24. Municipal Corporations <s=>218(9)
Substantial evidence standard applies
when Court of Appeals reviews factual findings of city civil service commission in disciplinary proceeding.
25. Administrative Law and Procedure
"Substantial evidence'' is that quantum
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince reasonable mind to support
conclusion.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions

26. Municipal Corporations <®=>218(9)
Court of Appeals defers to city civil service commission's findings in disciplinary

27. Municipal Corporations <2>185(11)
Discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within sound discretion of city police
chief.
28. Municipal Corporations (^185(11)
City police chief abuses his discretion in
imposing discipline on employee if punishment exceeds range of sanctions permitted
by statute or regulation, or if, in light of all
circumstances, punishment is disproportionate to offense.
29. Municipal Corporations C=>185(11)
Pursuant to city civil service commission's rules and regulations, providing that
discipline is vested in appointing power, that
progressive discipline shall be administered
by appointing power and that severity of
offense will determine steps required for progressive discipline, use of progressive discipline is committed to police chiefs discretion,
based on chiefs determination of seventy of
offense.
30. Municipal Corporations @»185(1)
Even assuming city police officer was
dishonest regarding placement of his gun,
termination was so disproportionate to dishonesty charge that it amounted to abuse of
chiefs discretion, where charge was based on
unsubstantiated claim of excessive force
which never determined gun placement, evidence supporting charge was slim and inconsistent, other officers disciplined solely for
dishonesty were suspended and officer's service record was exemplary.
Bryon J. Benevento and D. Matthew Moscon, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner.
H. Craig Hall, Murray, and Dennis C.
Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Before WILKINS, Associate P.J., and
DAVIS and BENCH, JJ.
OPINION
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Edward J. Lucas appeals <**
decision of the Murray City Civil S e n ^

LUCAS v. MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE COM'N

Utah

749

Cite as 949 P.2d 746 (UtahApp. 1997)

mination as a Murray City Police Officer.
We reverse the Commission's decision and
reinstate Lucas with back pay.
BACKGROUND
Lucas served as a police officer for the
Murray City Police Department (Department) from July 1, 1985 through August 21,
1996. During that time, Lucas was considered by his superiors to be an outstanding
officer. His service record shows that he
had always met or exceeded the Department's expectations and that he received all
available merit raises. In addition, Lucas's
exemplary service earned him the "Merit of
Honor" award—the most prestigious award
presented to an officer. He is the only officer in the Department to have ever received
this honor. Until August 1996, Lucas had
never been reprimanded, disciplined, or investigated by internal affairs.
On August 21, 1996, the Department fired
Lucas for allegedly lying during an internal
affairs investigation regarding an allegation
that Lucas had used excessive force while
searching an arrestee. The internal affairs
investigation arose from the circumstances
surrounding the May 27, 1996 arrest of Martin Spegar.
On the evening of May 27, Officers Snow,
Johnson, and Lucas were dispatched to a
Murray City car dealership to investigate a
vehicle burglary in progress. Upon arriving,
Officer Snow saw two males running through
* parking lot adjacent to the dealership and
climbing over a wall Within moments, Officer Snow received information that three
^spects had been apprehended. Officer
h n s o n ha
d one suspect, Dustin Garcia, in
^stody, and Officer Lucas had apprehended
pothers, Michael Hambiin and Spegar.
~ * ^ e it was dark and raining, the officers
g i n n e d only a basic pat down search at
OmJTy b e f o r e teking them to the Murray
&*L Ice DePartment. Lucas transported
£** without incident, and was, as Spegar
^ v e r y courteous.
| 4 ^ 6 S t a t i o n ' sP^gar and Hambiin were
Ifeea,^ f i n i n g office*. Garcia was
**** f e ^ m t e n i e w room about twenty to
- e t **a y from both Spegar and Kam-

biin. Officer Johnson searched Hambiin, Officer Snow searched Garcia, and Officer Lucas "kept an eye on Spegar." During that
time, Officer Lucas performed a more thorough search and asked Spegar to empty his
pockets. After Officer Snow saw Spegar
emptying his pockets, he walked into the
room to take Spegar's statement and Officer
Lucas left. Nothing was said. Eventually,
all three suspects were searched, mirandized,
interviewed, and taken to jail. En route to
the jail, Officer Snow noted that Spegar was
not upset and was joking with his friends.
A few days later, Lieutenant Fondaco, Lucas's superior, received a letter about Lucas's
alleged conduct during Spegar's search.
Spegar's written statement alleged:
[Officer Lucas] told me to stand up and
empty my pockets onto the table, and also
to take off my hat. He then asked me to
wait before I did it. He [illegible] for a
minute and took out his gun from his
holster and pointed it in the direction of
my head. He was standing about three
feet away from me. He then [said] "I dare
you to pull out a gun because if you do I
swear that I will [ ] kill you," and that your
brains will be splattered on the wall!
I then [said] "Hey man, I might be crazy
trying to break into cars, but I'm not going
to pull anything on you."
[Lucas] said, "I don't care, but I am that
crazy."
On June 10, 1996, Lieutenant Fondaco began an internal affairs investigation into Officer Lucas's alleged use of excessive force.
During the investigation, Lucas was interviewed on two separate occasions. During
the first interview, conducted by Lieutenant
Fondaco, Lucas described the incident as
follows. Lucas stated that he walked into
the room where Spegar was being held. He
unhandcuffed Spegar and told him to empty
his pockets. Instead of reaching for his
pocket, Spegar reached for the crotch area of
his pants. Lucas testified that he believed
that Spegar may have been going for a weapon because he knew, as a result of his cursory search of Spegar at the scene, that Spegar
had something in his pocket. Immediately,
Lucas reacted by pushing Spegar away, yelling "nut voui* handb on the wail/' and rfWh-
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ing for and unsnapping his weapon. He
stated that he believed that he started to pull
his gun out, but that it remained in the
holster. At that point, Lucas searched Spegar's legs and crotch, and then asked Spegar
to empty his pockets, which contained pliers,
a flashlight, and other miscellaneous items.
At some time during the internal affairs
investigation, Officer Snow gave a written
statement regarding what he observed. Officer Snow related that after searching Garcia
and taking his statement in the interview
room, he went down the hall toward the
office in which Spegar was being held. Officer Snow paused briefly before entering the
office when he noticed that Officer Lucas had
his gun out of its holster and pointed at the
ground, in a "low ready position." He saw
Spegar standing sideways, not looking directly at Officer Lucas. He watched as Spegar
took off his hat and noticed a flashlight and
pliers on the table. Officer Snow stated that
as he entered the room to take Spegar's
statement, Officer Lucas holstered his weapon and then left. He stated he did not hear
or observe anything that had happened before and stated he did not see Officer Lucas
point his gun at Spegar. In addition, Officer
Snow filed a police report and did not mention any of the events he observed between
Officer Lucas and Spegar because, as he
stated, "I hadn't even considered it a policy
violation."
Garcia asserted that while in the interview
room, about twenty to thirty feet away, he
overheard Lucas threaten Spegar. However,
Hamblin, who was in the office next to Spegar, heard nothing. Moreover, Officer Snow,
who was en route from Garcia's room to
Spegar's room, also heard nothing.
As a result of this information, the focus of
the internal affairs investigation became
whether Lucas had been dishonest during
the excessive force investigation. As part of
the investigation, both Lucas and Spegar
agreed to take a polygraph test on July 11,
1996. During the polygraph test, Spegar
initially stated that Lucas had pointed the
gun at his head. Then, as the interview
progressed, he stated that, looking back, the
gun may have been pointed at him or else-

however, state that Lucas's gun was definitely out of its holster. During Lucas's polygraph test, Lucas stated that he still perceived that his gun was holstered, but that he
had no reason to doubt Officer Snow's statement. Both interviews were transcribed.
Lucas's polygraph test could not be administered because "yes" and "no" questions could
not be posed; Spegar's test was inconclusive.
After reviewing this information, Lieutenant Fondaco concluded that Officer Lucas
had been dishonest and, on July 26, 1996,
recommended that he be discharged. On
August 5, 1996, Officer Lucas received a
pretermination notice listing four grounds for
discharge: (1) dishonesty in denying the
events which occurred concerning a service
weapon; (2) excessive force; (3) improper
search techniques; and (4) conduct unbecoming an officer. On August 7, 1997, Chief
Killian conducted Lucas's pretermination
hearing. During that hearing, Lucas tried to
address each of the grounds for termination,
although the record shows that even the
Chief was unclear as to what evidence supported the charge of "improper search techniques." In discussing the charges, Lucas
again explained:
Spegar is in my custody. I start to pat
him down. He's got something protruding
from his pocket. I grab it and pull on it.
He starts yelling. What's wrong? He's
not saying anything, just smiles. It's kind
of weird. Pulled on it again, obvious discomfort. Well, it's dark here, I can't see
what's going on. It's rainmg. It's inappropriate to do this here. I'm not going to
unhandcuff him outside in the street to let
him empty his pockets, and I'm not sticking my hand down in there. I don't know
if it's a blade. I don't know what's going
on. So, obviously it's going to be something he's gonna have to do. I'm going to
do that in a well-lit situation, in the department, so I chose to transport him as suchHandcuff him in my front seat where
could keep an eye on him where if he a
make any further movements, I c a n
appropriate action.
I believe he has sharp devices in his poc
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cause of previous occurrences out in the
field. Okay, the instructions were clearly
given. The first thing he does is put both
hands dii'ectly down in his crotch, the location of choice for people out in the street to
carry a weapon. Now in direct correspondence with my training, I react. My hand
goes up, and I keep him away from [me].
My hand goes for my weapon. I unsnap
it, and it starts to come out. Now at this
point, this is where we have a problem
because I am leaning forward pushing
against the wall telling him to get his
hands against the wall, "what the hell do
you think you're doing?" . . . My perception when I was questioned about it, it's in
the holster. Yes, it's ready to come out
because I am acting accordingly, according
to my training, and I'm ready to do whatever is necessary.
OR August 21, 1996, Chief Killian ordered
Lucas's discharge based on dishonesty, specifically the "untruthful statements" made by
Lucas during the course of the internal affairs investigation and during the pretermination hearing. Lucas timely appealed to the
Civil Service Commission, which scheduled a
hearing on November 19,1996.
Before that hearing, the Commission heard
argument on Murray City's "Motion in Limine" to exclude from the hearing any evidence regarding Lucas's claim of a retaliatory discharge and to exclude witnesses, which
Lucas argued would testify in support of this
claim. Lucas claimed that Lieutenant Fondaco and Chief Killian's motives for recommending and then ordering his discharge
^ere based on claims of police misconduct he
kad filed with the Utah Attorney General's
office.1 Without any reasoning, findings, or
•fusions, the Commission granted the mo^ ^ r the hearing on November 19, 1996,
Commission affirmed Chief Killian's deci00

ctom dQfm ° r r c l a h a t o r v discharge is based
officer fii* A m i s c o n d u c t that he and another
«#»<*** U , t h t h e U t a h Attorney General's
*«ment A L l e u U i n a m F ondacc and the De
rdmg t 0 L u C a s L i e u l e n a n l F o n
^tQ often ur C d° XCeS5
'
"
t Has m, «?L ?
»ve force against arrestees
cle* r K e d m a b l d - n S S i n g scheme involva n e B e ! P a , r , u n d c r D I l c m g These claims,

^F,
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-

.-

mlunated Ch J Lilian/' uho

sion to terminate Officer Lucas, finding his
statements regarding the use of his weapon
both inconsistent and incredible because his
statements had "changed substantially" from
interview to interview. Officer Lucas appeals the Commission's decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the Commission's final order, which affirmed Officer Lucas's discharge
from the Department, is limited to "determining if the commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1996); Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv.
Comm% 908 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah CtApp.
1995).
ANALYSIS
Lucas challenges on several grounds the
Commission's decision to affirm his discharge. Initially, Lucas asserts this case
should be remanded to the Commission for a
new hearing because the Commission violated his due process rights by: (1) failing to
comply with the Department's policy and
procedure during Lucas's disciplinary hearing; (2) excluding audiotape evidence required to impeach Spegar's testimony; (3)
excluding evidence in support of Lucas's
claim of retaliatory discharge; and (4) allowing its legal advisor to participate in the
capacity of a commissioner. In addition, Lucas asserts he should be reinstated with back
pay because (1) insufficient evidence exists to
support the dishonesty charge, and (2) termination is a disproportionate punishment for
such a charge.
I. PROPERTY INTEREST DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
[1] Lucas argues he has a property interdemanded die claims be dropped and demanded
to know the identities of the officers making the
allegations According to Lucas and two other
witnesses, Chief Killian was aware that Lucas
had made the allegations of misconduct In response, the City provided affidavits from Chief
Killian and Lieutenant Fondaco, in which both
stated the\ did not know the identity of the
claimants.
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est in continued public employment,2 entitling him to notice and an opportunity to be
heard before any deprivation of that interest.
The City argues Lucas was afforded due
process consistent with that required in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996) and that any
procedural defect was immaterial to the
Commission's determination that Lucas's discharge was appropriate. Before addressing
the specific due process arguments, we must
first determine if Lucas has a property interest in continued public employment, which
interest cannot be deprived except pursuant
to constitutionally adequate procedures. In
addition, we must determine to what process
Lucas is entitled.
[2,3] The Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that no
state shall deprive any person of property
without due process of law.3 See U.S. Const,
amend. XIV, sec. 1. While the Constitution
guarantees due process before the deprivation of property interests, such interests are
not created by the Constitution. Rather,
property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Board of
Regents v. Rozh, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct.
2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). "To have
a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He [or she] must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
[or she] must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it." Id.
[4] In Board of Regents v. Roth, the
United States Supreme Court stated that
public employees have a property interest
in continued employment if contractual or
statutory provisions guarantee continued
employment absent "sufficient cause" for
discharge. See id. at 576-78, 92 S.Ct. at
2708-10. If a property interest in continued employment exists, then the employee
is entitled to procedures comporting with
the minimum requirements of due process,
as provided in the Constitution. See Cleve-

land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492, 84 L.Ed.2d
494 (1985) ("Minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law[;]
they are not diminished by the fact that the
State may have specified its own procedures
that it may deem adequate for determimng
the preconditions to adverse official action.'" (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263, 63 L.Ed.2d
552 (1980))). If no property interest exists,
then the employee must rely solely upon
any procedural protections afforded by contract, ordinance, or state statute.
In this case, we look to state law, specifically the Civil Service statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996), to determine
whether Lucas has a property interest m
continued employment as a police officer absent "sufficient cause" for discharge. Section 10-3-1012 provides, m pertinent part:
All persons in the classified civil service
may be suspended as provided in Section
10-3-912, or removed from office or employment by the head of the department
for misconduct, incompetency, failure to
perform his [or her] duties, or failure to
observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the suspended or discharged person to the civil
service commission . . . which shall fully
hear and determine the matter.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996) (emphasis added). The statute specifically lists the
reasons for which a civil service employee
may be discharged. The reasons supporting
discharge are clearly directed at employee
behavior that "is detrimental to the efficiency
of the employing agency." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,162-63, 94 S.Ct. 1633,164849, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (interpreting statute
providing for discharge for "such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the s ^ ^ T
prohibit discharge "without cause"). ™*
language, with "unmistakable clarity/' g ^
civil service employees security a ^ a i n s i ^ ^
charge "without cause," id. at 154, 94 S.Ct
1644, and thus limits both the departed
the 5310^

2. The Utah Supreme Court has referred to public
employment as a property right requiring due
nroc ess unon discharge See Vvorrall v Ozden

3. The Utah Constitution guarantees w
protection under article 1, section 7
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head's and the Commission's discretion in
making employment decisions. See Marvin
v. King, 734 F.Supp. 346, 354 (S.D.Ind.1990)
(stating Commission cannot base discharge
on "arbitrary matter [upon] which employers
of at-will employees are free to base their
employment decisions"); Boreen v. Chnstenscn, 267 Mont. 405, 884 P.2d 761, 767 (1994).
Therefore, as a civil service employee, Lucas
had a vested right to continued employment
absent a legal cause for termination.
II.

PRE-DEPRIVATION &
POST-DEPRIVATION
DUE PROCESS
[5-7] Because section 10-3-1012 confers
upon civil service employees a property interest m continued employment, we must
determine what process is due. The essential principle of due process requires that a
deprivation of any significant property interest "be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case." Midlane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652,
656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (emphasis added) "An employee's right to fair notice and
an opportunity to 'present his [or her] side of
the story' before discharge is not a matter of
legislative grace, but of 'constitutional guarantee."' Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 105
S.Ct. at 1493. Post-deprivation procedures,
while not constitutionally guaranteed, must
comport with due process requirements providing for a fair hearing. See Loudermill,
4
?0 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1496 (stating
due process requires post-termination administrative procedures "at a meaningful time"
^ provided by statute), see also Bunnell v
A* the Utah Supreme Court has stated
ue
P roc ess is not a technical conception with
a
«xed content unrelated to time, place, and
c
"cumsunces it is llexibl e and requires such
ProlCLtlons as the
t^d
Particular situan
emands In an analysis of a procedure,
important factor is the risk of an enoneoub
P m ? T , 0 n ° f a p n v a t e m t e r e s l throueh the
a R d Lhc
MdiuT'
P l o b a b l e value, if anv, of
H
W a / ; ° r f l ° r s u h s l l t u t e procedural safeguards
*** rer,
? d a t 6 0 2 T h e Loudermill Court

^Ccn g l h f u u
^3r es ^

the n c x i b l h l

>'

of d u e

P™ cess '

? e x i s ^ n c e of post-termination pro-

dnl l
^«TTunat
° lhe n e c e s s a r v sc°Pe of
Th
^"isom1*0" P r 0 c e d m e s
^ Court stated
* * * * sat,cf nS i anCes a P 0 st-depnvation hearllsh
due process requirements See

Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331. 1333
(Utah 1987) ("[E]very person who brings a
claim in a court or at a hearing held before
an administrative agency has a due process
right to receive a fair trial in front of a fail*
tribunal").
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84
L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the United States Supreme Court determined what process is due
a discharged employee with the right to continued employment. In doing so, the Court
balanced the competing interests at stake,
including "the private interests in retaining
employment, the governmental interest in
the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative
burdens, and the risk of erroneous termination." Id. at 542-43, 105 S.Ct. at 1493;
accord Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
In light of these interests, the Court concluded that before termination, minimum due
process entitles an employee to oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of
the employer's evidence, and an opportunity
for the employee to present his or her side of
the story m "'something less' than a full
evidentiary hearing." Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 542, 545, 105 S.Ct. at 1493, 1495 (quoting
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct at 907).
In addition, because the Ohio statute, which
created the property interest m public employment, also provided for a full post-termination hearing, the Loudernull Court also
determined that due process in that case
required a full, timely post-termination hearing.4
Cleveland Bd of Educ v Loudermill, 470 U S
532, 542 n 7, 105 S Ct 1487, 1493 n 7, 84
L Ed 2d 494 (1985) And, in some instances, as
Loudermill establishes, both pretermmation and
post-termination procedures are required However, Justice Marshall emphasized m his concurrence in Loudermill that due process requires
more, in that, before a decision is made to terminate employment an employee should be entitled
to test the strength of the evidence by confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses See
id at 548-49, 105 S Ct at 1496-97 (Marshall, J ,
concurring) He aigued that better pretermmation procedures would ensure against the risk of
an erroneous deprivation, resulting m lost wages
and undue delay See id at 549, 105 S Ct at
1497 (Marshall, J , concurring) However al-
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Applying Loudermill, we conclude that under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the
provision in section 1Q-3-1012 for a posttermination hearing, Lucas is entitled to due
process by way of oral or written notice of
the charges, an explanation of the employer's
evidence, an opportunity to respond to the
charges in "something less" than a full evidentiary healing before termination, coupled
with a full post-termination hearing "at a
meaningful time." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
546-47,105 S.Ct. at 1495-96; see also Mondt
v. Cheyenne Police Dep't, 924 P.2d 70, 82
(Wyo.1996) (requiring full evidentiary hearing and examination of witnesses as provided
by statute). It is a clear abuse of discretion
for the Commission to exercise its discretion
in such a way as to deny due process to a
party appearing before it. See Tolman v.
Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28
(Utah Ct.App.1991).
We therefore address Lucas's due process
arguments in light of both constitutionally
and statutorily required pre- and post-termination due process procedures.
A. City's Failure to Comply with Its
Rules and Regulations in Course
of Disciplinary Action
[8] Pretermination due process requires
notice of the charges, an explanation of the
evidence, and an opportunity to respond. To
give effect to these constitutional protections,
public agencies such as the Department and
the Commission promulgate rules and regulations governing disciplinary procedures.
"In disciplinary proceedings, a public body
must comply with its own rules and an employee being disciplined is entitled to rely
upon those rules." Bell v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n. 161 Ill.App.3d 644, 113 Ill.Dec. 439,
443, 515 N.E.2d 248, 252 (1987). Lucas asserts that the Department deprived him of
due process by failing to comply with its own
procedures that limit the time to conduct an
internal affairs investigation and that provide
for written notice of the allegations. See
Worrall, 616 P.2d at 601, 602 (stating officer
had property interest in continued employthough arguing due process should provide more
protection befoie termination, Justice Marshall
concurred to the extent the parties m Loudermill

ment requiring due process through established guidelines to terminate that employment).
[9] First, Murray City Police Department Policy 555, III(E) requires the Department complete internal affairs investigations
within thirty days. The record shows that
the investigation here lasted about forty-six
days, violating Department policy. However,
beyond merely asserting that a delay occurred, Lucas reveals nothing about the delay and fails to provide any evidence that the
delay was unreasonably prolonged. A mere
delay alone in conducting an internal affairs
investigation does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation per se. See, e.g.,
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547, 105 S.Ct. at
1496 (holding that nine-month delay in posttermination hearing is not unconstitutionally
lengthy per se).
[10] Second, Murray City Police Department Policy 555, III(G) requires that "[p]nor
to any interview of an accused member as
part of an Internal Affairs Investigation, the
member will be given written notification of
the allegations, and their rights and responsibilities relative to the investigation." Lucas
argues he received inadequate notice of the
charges against him in that before his initial
interview, he was not informed or given written notice of the excessive force investigation, and, when the investigation changed
focus to dishonesty, he was not told orally or
in writing.
Although the record shows the Department failed to strictly comply with its procedure, the fundamental requirements of due
process were met. Lucas did not receive
written notice of either allegations of excessive force or dishonesty; however the record
shows that Lucas did in fact have notice of
the pending charges and was able to respon
to the charges before the termination was
implemented. First, although hesitant*
Lieutenant Fondaco told Lucas that the voxtial interview was based on an a U e £ a t o ' ^
excessive force and, during the i n t e r v ^
Lieutenant Fondaco read Spegar>s wn
requested only notice and an °VPorixf^
heard See id at 548, 105 S Ct at 14W
shall, . , concurring

h£
(Mar.
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statement to Lucas. Second, the transcript
of Lucas's polygraph test interview clearly
shows Lucas's knowledge of Spegar's complaint and Officer Snow's statement. In fact,
Lucas repeatedly clarified that his original
statement was not "dishonest" and that he
"does not lie." Third, prior to termination,
Lucas was formally notified in writing of the
charges against him. And, finally, he was
afforded a pretermination hearing in which
he specifically addressed each charge and the
evidence against him.
Furthermore, Lucas fails to establish how
these procedural errors were harmful, e.g.,
he did not have time to prepare for the
hearing or, how these procedures would have
resulted in a different outcome absent such
errors. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
547, 105 S.Ct. at 1496; cf. State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) ("[T]he likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in [the
decision]."); State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949,
958 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (stating evidence
must be "sufficiently inconsequential that we
conclude there is no 'reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings'" (quoting State v. Verde, 770
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)), ajfd, 889 P.2d
419 (Utah 1995)). Under the facts of this
case, we cannot say that Lucas was denied
due process when the record shows that Lucas had actual notice of the excessive force
and dishonesty charges, received written notice of the charges against him, and had a
pretermination opportunity to respond to the
charges.

termination hearing by excluding evidence
supporting his theory of retaliatory discharge. Before Lucas's post-termination
hearing, the Department moved to exclude
all evidence supporting his claim that his
discharge was based on Lieutenant Fondaco's and Chief Killian's alleged bias and retaliatory motives. The Commission, without
making any findings or providing any reasoning, granted the Department's motion.
[12,13] Lucas challenges the exclusion of
the retaliatory discharge evidence, arguing
that the Commission erred in excluding evidence of Lieutenant Fondaco's and Chief Killian's alleged biases and retaliatory motives,
which Lucas claims are admissible under
Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1996).5 The
City counters by arguing such evidence was
irrelevant and immaterial to the Commission's limited inquiry—whether Lucas was
dishonest, and whether the charge of dishonesty warranted Lucas's discharge.

B- Commission's Exclusion of Retaliatory
Discharge Evidence
Ml Lucas argues the Commission failed
^ provide him with a full and fair post-

[14] Before addressing Lucas's argument, we recognize that the Civil Service
Commission is a local municipal tribunal of
limited jurisdiction. See Piercey v. Civil
Sew. Comm'n. 116 Utah 135, 141, 208 P.2d
1123, 1125-26 (1949); Salt Lake City Corp.,
908 P.2d at 875. The Commission is neither
a court of law nor a state administrative
agency subject to the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA). See Tolman, 818
P.2d at 26 n. 3 (stating UAPA only applies to
state, not local, agency action). In addition,
as a municipal administrative body, the Commission is not bound by formal rules of evidence and procedure. See Murray City Civil
Service Commission, Rules and Regulations
13-10 (1996) ("At all hearings the Commis-

ucas also
argues that ihe Commission erred in
granting the City's motion to exclude the eviden
<* without
ut 2ivin<T
giving any reasoning and without
nutkinn g anV f l n c l i n s o r
dtc/
£
conclusions to support its
adm?011 T h l S C O u r t h a s emphasized that an
0 j a t m , s l l a t l V e <%enc\ must make findings of fact
ar
detailed so as to permit
n ^ ^ e suffiUentl\
B o a J f D1 a p p e l I d l e review
See Adams v
CLtah r K " n i °f I»dus Comm n, 821 P 2d 1, 4
For
view th l p P P l99U
us to meaningfully re" ' -su{fj B o a r d * findings, the findings must be
^djary £ e n l K d^tailed and include enough subacLs
to disJose the steps by which the

ultimale conclusion on each factual issue was
reached"
The failure of an agencv to make
adequate findings of fact in material issues renders its hndmgs "arbitrary and capricious" unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and
capable ol only one conclusion " ' " Id at 4-5
(quoting N\rehn v Industrial Comm'n, 800 P 2d
330, 335 (Utah Ct App 1990) (citations omitted))
In this case, the Commission s decision granting
Murray City s Motion in Limine without providing any findings, conclusions, or reasoning was
arbitrary and capricious Therefore, the Commission abused its discretion
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sion will determine the admissibility of evidence and shall use as near as it deems
practicable the rules of evidence followed in
the Courts in this State."); cf Flicker v.
State Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 453
(Utah 1983) ("Administrative proceedings are
usually conducted with greater flexibility and
informality than judicial proceedings[, thus,]
[rjigid adherence to judicial procedures in
administrative proceedings is generally inappropriate because it ignores basic differences
between judicial and administrative procedures.").
[15,16] However, although the Commission is not bound by formal rules of evidence
and procedure, it is not above the law. See
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31. In the absence of
formal legal rules, the Commission must "determine what evidence should, in 'fairness/
be admitted." Id. The evidence must be
legally relevant, in that it has " 'some probative weight and reliability.'" Id. (citation
omitted). "Whether certain evidence is relevant . . . is a question of law. which we
review under a correction-of-error standard."
State v Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah
Ct.App.1991).
In this case, evidence relating to Chief
Killian's and Lieutenant Fondaco's credibility, i.e., evidence of bias and retaliatory motives, is relevant and material to the Commission's review of Chief Killian's decision to
discharge Lucas. Lucas argues that Chief
Killian's decision and Lieutenant Fondaco's
recommendation to discharge him wTere
based on retaliation. It is widely recognized
that an employer's motive is a key element of
retaliatory discharge. See Lihosit v. I & W,
Inc., 121 N.M. 455, 913 P.2d 262, 265
(N.M.Ct.App.1996). Moreover, under both
the Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah law,
evidence of a witness's motive or bias is
admissible to challenge that witness's credibility.
[17] Rule 608(c) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence provides that "[b]ias, prejudice or
any motive to misrepresent may be shown to
impeach the witness either by examination of
the witness or by evidence otherwise adA„~A
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in every case[,] the credibility of the witness may be drawn into question, by the
manner in which he [or she] testifies, by
the character of his [or her] testimony, or
by evidence affecting his [or her] character
for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his
[or her] motives, or by contradictory evidence.
Utah case law supports the well estabhshed
principle that testimony reflecting on the
bias and motives of a witness is admissible at
trial. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A) Inc. v. 11th Ave.
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 459 (Utah 1993); State v.
Hackfora\ 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987);
State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah
1985); State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438, 438
(Utah 1982). Although the Commission is
not bound by formal rules, due process requires that in a full post-termination hearing,
an employee be given an opportunity to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses, which includes challenging witness
credibility. See Post v. Harper, 980 F.2d
491, 493 (8th Cir.1992).
In this case, the Commission's role is limited to either affirming or reversing the
Chiefs decision to terminate Lucas, a decision based in part on Lieutenant Fondaco's
recommendation. The Commission relied on
the testimonies of Chief Killian, Lieutenant
Fondaco, and Martin Spegar in reaching its
decision to affirm the Chiefs discharge order. The excluded evidence of Chief Killian's
and Lieutenant Fondaco's intent, bias, and
motives directly relates to their credibility
The Commission's exclusion of the retaliatory
discharge evidence prevented Lucas from
challenging the credibility of two primary
witnesses.^ In addition, the Commission's
failure to consider evidence challenging Chief
Killian's credibility effectively prevented the
Commission from properly reviewing the
Chiefs decision to "terminate Lucas. See
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 32 (holding County Career Services Council's failure to consider
terminated employee's legal contentions prevented fair review of county attorney's decision to terminate employee). Tnerefof'ev^
Commission erred m excluding Lucas s
dence of retaliatory discharge ^cause
evidence was relevant to Chief Killian s ^
ibility and to the Commission's ^ ^ ^ cf
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Review of Indus. Comm'n, 748 P.2d 569, 572
(Utah 1987) (holding Commission erred in
excluding critically relevant and material testimony).

directly at him. Lucas attempted to impeach
Spegar by playing the tape-recording of Spegar's polygraph interview. The Commission,
however, via its legal advisor's sua sponte
ruling, excluded the audiotape for lack of
foundation, concluding that Spegar could not
authenticate his own voice.

[18,19] Murray City, however, argues
that even if the Commission erred in excluding the evidence regarding Lucas's claim of
We agree the Commission may have
retaliatory discharge, the error was harmless. Murray City correctly notes that a[a]n erred in excluding the audiotape evidence
erroneous decision to admit or exclude evi- for lack of foundation. See Utah R. Evid.
dence does not constitute reversible error 901(b)(5) (allowing party to authenticate own
unless the error is harmful." Cat Wads- voice): see, e.g., People v. Williams, 16
toorth Constr. v. St. George, 898 P.2d 1372. Cal.4th 635, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 589, 941
1378 (Utah 1995). However, as stated above, P.2d 752, 768 (1997) (stating audiotape adthe evidence Lucas proffered directly relates missible upon detective's testimony that he
to the credibility of Chief Killian and Lieu- was party to recorded conversation). Howtenant Fondaco, two of the three witnesses ever, the Commission did not prevent Lucas
whose testimony the Commission relied upon from impeaching Spegar. Lucas had access
in reaching its decision. In addition, because to, but failed to avail himself of, other
the Commission is limited to either affirming means available to impeach Spegar at the
or reversing the Chiefs decision, his credibil- time he testified, e.g., the transcribed copy
ity, motives, and bias are directly at issue. of the polygraph interview. The transcripHad the Commission heard the retaliatory tion was later admitted into evidence, but
discharge evidence, there is a substantial never used to impeach Spegar. Therefore,
likelihood of a different outcome sufficient to the error was harmless. See State v.
undermine our confidence in the Commis- Knight, 734 R2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); acsion's decision to affirm Lucas's discharge. cord VilLaireal, S57 P.2d at 957-58.
See Harhne v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442
(Utah 1996).
D. Commission's Authority to Allow Legal
Advisor's Active Participation
Thus, because the credibility of both Lieutenant Fondaco and Chief Killian is directly
[21] Lucas argues that the Commission
relevant and material to the Commission's exceeded its statutorily limited authority in
fair evaluation of the Chiefs decision to ter- allowing its legal advisor to actively particiminate Lucas, the Commission erred in ex- pate, question, and make sua sponte rulings
cluding the evidence supporting Lucas's as to the admissibility of evidence during the
c&m of retaliatory discharge. The Commis- hearing. We disagree. There is nothing in
sion thereby violated Lucas's right to due either the statute creating the Commission's
process in excluding the evidence of retaliato- authority, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to ry discharge and preventing Lucas from ef- 1013 (1996), or the Murray City Civil Service
fc&vely challenging witness credibility.
Commission's Rules and Regulations to preclude or limit the Commission's use of a legal
Commission's Exclusion of Audiotape
advisor. Further, because the Commission
for Impeachment Purposes
must deal with both evidentiary rules and
i During the tape-recorded polygraph legal issues, advice from independent legal
a ^ * w ' Spegar acknowledged that he counsel may in many cases be necessary. A
conflict wTould arise if the Commission's legal
fceat n b e e n m i s t a k e n a s t 0 t h e P l a c e _
SS gun stating the gun could
advisor simultaneously served as both an adfe*ve hni
»
^**
Ported at his head, his torso, or vocate and an advisor. See Hamilton v. City
«3caminad e floor- However, during cross- of Mesa, 185 Ariz. 420, 916 P.2d 1136, 1143
However, absent a
Speg^ d ° n . a t t h e Post-termination hearing, (Ariz.Ct.App.1995).
m a k l n g t h a t s t a t e m e n t a n d showing of any actual bias or partiality, there
fcstified th1 med
he
^ e w the gun was pointed is no due process violation. See, e.g., id
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(holding city manager seeking advice from
independent legal advisor, absent showing of
actual bias or partiality, insufficient to establish due process violation). In this case, the
Commission did not exceed its authority by
either deferring to the independent advisor's
legal advice or acquiescing to the advisor's
active participation in the hearing. The ultimate responsibility for all these matters
rests with the Commission, and it is at liberty to rely upon the advice of its chosen legal
advisor.
III. COMMISSION'S REVIEW
OF CHIEF'S DECISION
[22] Section 10-3-1012 states the Commission "shall fully hear and determine" appeals of suspension or termination brought
by civil service employees. The Utah Supreme Court, in Vetterli v. Civil Service
Commission, 106 Utah 83, 145 P.2d 792
(1944), established that the Commission's review of disciplinary decisions mvolves two
inquiries: (1) do the facts support the
charges made by the department head, and,
if so, (2) do the charges warrant the sanction
imposed? See id., 145 P.2d at 796; In re
Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361
(Utah 1986). If the Commission answers no
to either of these inquiries, it must reverse
the department head's actions.
A. Factual Basis for Dishonesty Charge
[23,24] We first address whether the
facts support the charge of dishonesty. In
addressing this issue, we must determine the
appropriate standard of review to be applied
to the Commission's findings. As stated
above, the Commission is a local, municipal
agency regulating employment in the police,
fire, and health departments; it monitors
hiring, promotion, suspension, and termination in those city agencies. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to -1011 (1996); accord
Salt Lake City Corp., 908 P.2d at 875. The
Commission also hears appeals from department heads' suspension and termination decisions. See Utah Code. Ann. §§ 10-3-1012
to -1012.5 (1996). Although the Commission
is not subject to UAPA, it functions similarly
to such state administrative agencies as the
Career Service Review Board. See, e.g.,

Kent v. Department of Employment Sec, 860
P.2d 984, 985 (Utah CtApp.1993) (stating
sole purpose of Career Service Review Board
is reviewing agency decisions regarding career service employees). Therefore, we
adopt and apply the "substantial evidence"
standard applicable to a state administrative
agency's findings of fact.
[25,26] The Commission's findings, upon
which the charges are based, must be supported by substantial evidence viewed in
light of the whole record before us. See
Larson Limestone Co. v. State, 903 P.2d 429,
430 (Utah 1995). Substantial evidence "'is
that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Id
(quoting First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah
1990)); see also A.M.L. v. Department of
Health, 863 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah.Ct.App.1993)
(stating evidence is not substantial if overwhelmed by other evidence or based on mere
conclusion). It is more than a mere " 'scintilla' of evidence and something less than the
weight of the evidence." Johnson v Board
of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 842 P.2d 910,
911 (Utah.CtApp.1992) (citation omitted)
We do not review the Commission's findings
de novo or reweigh the evidence. See Larson Limestone, 903 P.2d at 431. Instead, we
defer to the Commission's findings on issues
of credibility.
Based on our examination of the whole
record, we cannot say the Commission's finding that Lucas lied about his gun's position is
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Initially, we note that the allegation
of dishonesty arose from, as Murray City
acknowledged in its brief, an unsubstantiated
claim of excessive force. The internal affairs
investigation into Lucas's use of excessive
force was never completed and never rw
upon by the Commission. In addition, tnc
evidence presented in support of the ex
sive force charge was inconsistent and un
roborated. For instance, Spegar, who is ^
only eyewitness to Lucas's alleged us
excessive force, gave many incons
statements regarding the circumstances
^
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rounding his arrest and subsequent search.6
Particularly questionable are Spegar's statements that Lucas's gun could have been
pointed at his head, his torso, below his
waist, or at the ground. At the hearing,
Spegar testified that although he "didn't look
over at [Lucas]," he "knew" the gun was
pointed at him, but he could not "justify
whether it was at [his] head or not." In
addition, Spegar's claim that Lucas threatened to "blow his brains all over the wall"
was allegedly corroborated by Garcia who
testified to hearing the threat in the interview room approximately twenty to thirty
feet away from Spegar. However, Hamblin,
who was detained in the office next to Spegar, and Officer Snow, who had just left
Garcia in the interview room and was en
route to take Spegar's statement, heard
nothing.

ing his search of Spegar. Specifical
Commission found "Officer Lucas's
ments regarding the holstering and
stering of his weapon to be inconsistei
not credible[, and to have] . . . changec
stantially in subsequent interviews froi
statement initially given Lieutenant F
co." The Commission based its finding
Lucas's three transcribed interviews an
testimony given during the post-termin
hearing.

Contrary to the Commission's finding,
cas's statements regarding the events
rounding Spegar's arrest, his subseqi
search, and the position of Lucas's £
whether holstered or unholstered, were c
sistent. The transcripts of Lucas's inl
views and hearing testimony reveal that
clearly and consistently maintained that
perceived his gun to be holstered, but recc
In addition, the Commission heard and nized the possibility his gun could have be
relied upon the statements of Chief Killian unholstered and pointed at the floor, as w
and Lieutenant Fondaco, the credibility of nessed by a fellow officer.
whom Lucas was prevented from challengThe evidence shows that the internal s
ing. The post-termination hearing transcript fairs investigation of Lucas began with s
shows that Lieutenant Fondaco's and Chief allegation of excessive force. In a writte
Kilhan's testimony on the dishonesty issue statement, Spegar alleged:
was largely conclusory and speculative as
[Officer Lucas] told me to stand up an*
they testified mainly regarding their percepempty my pockets onto the table, and als<
tions of the evidence. For example, without
to take off my hat. He then asked me tc
any proof, and contrary to the testimony of
wait before I did it. He [illegible] for i
the only eyewitness, Chief Killian testified
minute and took out his gun from his
that "I know [the gun] wasn't two inches
holster and pointed it in the direction of
from the holster," and Lieutenant Fondaco
my head. He was standing about 3 feet
testified that "I am of the firm belief that
away from me. He then [said,] "I dare
Officer Lucas took his gun out of his holster,
you to pull out a gun because if you do I
Pointed it at Marty Spegar and then denied
swear that I will . . kill you," and that my
that tact to me in an internal affairs investibrains will be splattered on the wall!
gation."
Based on this allegation, Lieutenant Fondaco
initiated
the internal affairs investigation. In
to support of the charge of dishonesty, the
reilecl
the
first
of three interviews, Lieutenant FonCommission
primarily upon its finding
a t Luca
daco
read
the above allegation to Lucas and
*> ^ed about his gun's position dur' _ P c ' g a r £ d v e four statements regarding the aileron of extessn e force—the written statement
VVUh t h e c l a , m o f e x c e s s i v e f o r c e
oral
' the
g j r ^ m i e n , l e U U l l h L i e u l e n a n L Fondaco, SpeI&H* l r a , n s C n b e d a r L s v v e r s from the polygraph
lesllmonv at
nation^
Lucas's post-terminng
ReMcwin
*Wiem
g the record, Spegar'*
-*aichtt U, r Parl,< " ul<irIy l h o s c d e s c n b m S h l b
gUnS pIacement
^exTtl
' m s demeanor,
^friend ^ h e n , l l e discussed the incident with
*ndare % ^
* r o m o n e s t a l e m e n t to the next
i n s i s t e n t a a u hole. For instance, at

the hearing, Spegar for the first time related that
he had been searched up against the wall before
Lucas pulled out his gun, he stated that he was
both thoroughly and cursorily searched at the
scene of the arrest, that he had nothing m his
pockets when Lucas searched him at the station,
although Officer Snow testified that he saw several items, including pliers, emptied from his
pocket, that the gun was both pointed at hu>
head and that it was not, that he did not remember where the gun was, and that it was just
pointed m his general direction or at his waist
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asked "Is any of that true?" The following is
the exchanged dialogue.
LUCAS: The part that I had searched
him, yes it is. And when I went to search
him, he took his other hand, and he was
going right down, he had baggies on you
know. And he hadn't been adequately
searched yet. He went right down to his
crotch so I unsnapped my gun and said
"don't do that." So then I put him against
the wall and I searched him. But as far as
that other crap, no.
FONDACO: Okay. So, you unsnapped
your gun, put him against the wall and
searched him, but you never took your gun
out of the holster.
LUCAS: No, I unsnapped it you know
because I didn't know what he was doing.
As soon as his hand came out, you know
that was it. It was done. I put him
against the wall and I searched his crotch
real good you know. I said "what the heck
are you doing." . . a scratch. I said, well
that's pretty stupid, you know. I'm here
searching you for weapons and stuff and
you put your hand down your pants, you
know. He said, yeah that was pretty stupid.
FONDACO: So, I just want to make sure
I'm right. You unsnapped your weapon,
left it in the holster, then put him on the
wall, patted him down again, and then had
him empty his pockets, but your weapon
never came out of the holster. You never
pointed your weapon at him? You never
pointed your weapon at his head?
LUCAS: No.
FONDACO: You never threatened to kill
him?
LUCAS: No.
Shortly after, Officer Snow gave a written
statement, in which he acknowledged seeing
Lucas with his gun out of its holster, at his
side, pointing down at the ground. Lucas
was interviewed a second time, m conjunction
with a polygraph test he agreed to take, and
a third time, by Chief Killian in Lucas's
pretermination interview. In both interviews, Lucas's version of the events surrounding Spegar's arrest and subsequent
search remained consistent. In both mter-

that his gun could have been unholstered and
pointed at the floor. However, consistent
with his original interview, he repeatedly
stated that he perceived his gun had been
holstered.
In his second interview, Lucas stated.
I had my hand on him. Had my
weapon unsnapped, and I was leaning forward. I'm not looking down at my gun to
see exactly where it is you know. In hindsight maybe the officer walking by, he said
my gun was out and pointed down. That's
understandable. He may have seen it. It
is possible because when I'm leaning forward, I'm not paying attention over
there —
Like I said, I had it unsnapped, I had a full
grasp on it, leaning on him, leaning forward as he went to the wall. In my perception and I asked about it, is all I did is
grab [my gun], but you know in hindsight,
if I'm leaning forward and my adrenalin is
up and I got my gun uncocked as you will,
it [could] likely come out. Then I get
another officer who I have never known to
be deceptive saying that he saw it clear
leather, and I told him to always be honest, and if that's what he saw, that's what
he saw and to stick with it because I have
nothing to hide. And I don't.
But, whenever I was asked about it, I said
it was in my holster, and that's my perception. Now I'm getting information contrary to that so it makes me think, now I
have doubts.
During his pretermination interview, Lucas stated:
[W]hen I was interviewed [by] Lieutenant
Fondaco, I clearly told him that the gw
didn't come out of the holster. It was in
my holster, unsnapped. I'm leaning forward, pushing this guy away from me, so
I'm leaning away, and my gun is in an
out, sliding up and down. It could have
been beside me, it could have been pom
mg at the floor. My perception was it
in the holster. But, now I have an offi
who says he walks by and sees it po ^
at the floor, okay. I'm not real clear
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I was sure it didn't come cut of the holster.
Then the other parameters are introduced.
Is it possible? Yes, it is possible. Am I
sure? No, I'm not sure. It could be possible because my focus is on this son of a
gun now that's toying with me, not on [the
exact placement of my gun] by two or
three inches.
Finally, during the post-termination hearing. Lucas testified at length that he believed
then and now that his gun was holstered.
Lucas stated.
I told him that when I was interviewed byLieutenant Fondaco, I told him that I was
100 percent sure that my gun never left
my holster. When I came out of the interview and met with Officer Snow, Officer
Snow told me that he saw me with my gun
pointed to the floor. At that point, I had
doubts.
Lucas clearly testified that to his knowledge,
hih gun was holstered. However, he recognized that Snows statement raised doubts in
hib mind about his own perception of his
gun's position.
Based on our review of the record, Spegar's inconsistent statements regarding the
placement of Lucas's gun—pointed at his
head, torso, or the floor, the unsubstantiated
allegation of excessive force. Officer SnowY
statement that he did not see Lucas's gun
pointed at Spegar, combined with Lucas's
statements, the Commission's finding that
Lucas lied is not supported by substantial
evidence. However, even ii we were to assume that Lucas lied about the position of his
jrun—holstered or unnolstered and pointed a:
*he ground—dismissal for the charge of dishonesty under these circumstances is neitner
compiled n o r sunpoited by the record.
&• Termination Disproportionate
to Charge
^12<,2S] Luu^s argues that, under the
-w* <>f this case and in light of his outstar.df ^r*I(,e ivi-orri. femLiaricn is an exce<?*'"' dlM,1Phnary action : > his alleged of""* ' n determirinir wnetrer :ne char~^
-4M f<^c:fJiuiar~ acne" ta]:°r -v.- ,•1 (
, •- -' ' Miat (....-c-iine in-.-f-ed f™ en:*' ^^-'Jimuct i* within rh- ^uno d^crc-

tion of the Chief. See In re D wim
Jonea. 720 P.2d at 1363 (stating Chief
manage and direct his officers, and thus
best position to know whether then* ac
merit discipline). This discretion is abi
however, if the punishment exceeds
range of sanctions permitted by statut<
regulation, or if, in light of ail the eire
stances, the punishment is disproportioi
to the offense. See id.; see also Boya
United States, 211 Ct.Cl. 57, 543 F.2d 1:
1295 (1976) (" 'If a penalty is so harsh as
constitute an abuse, rather than an exerc
of discretion, it cannot be allowed to stand
(citations omitted)).
[29] Initially, Lucas argues that t
Chief and the Commission abused then* d
cretion by violating the policy and procedu
requiring progressive discipline and imposii
a punishment exceeding that permitted m
der the rules and regulations. Section 11of the Murray City Civil Service Commit
sion's Rules and Regulations, provides, i
pertinent partBasic responsibility for discipline is vestei
in the appointing power of each depart
ment and not in either the Civil Servict
Commission or the Mayor. Progressive
discipline which normally involves a verbal
reprimand, written reprimand, suspension
and termination shall be administered fairly and consistently by the appointing power. Severity of the offense will determine
the steps required for progressive discipline.
Murray City Civil Serice Commission Rules
and Regulations. * 11-1 (1996). Clearly,
Murray City adheres to a progre^sh'0 discipline policy: howevpr, the rule does not mandate the use of progressive discipline In every situation.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Percrco1
v. Depar+-)icr<i of Coir, czwnal Semccx, 23U
Neb. 508. 44c N.W.2d 211 (1989,% interpret
a rule Siini'ar to tne cue In this ca^e and heiu
tnat tne u^e of progressive discipline ia discretionary with the department dn'ector. In
Perci>'( \ :;tc ctatc Personnel Board dem^v'
ana tr^isitrred an emp'oyee within fiv- Department of ^rreeuonai Service^ *VL K.
^4~ N 1 V 2 ; ;- 21-. 7 ^ fcincui e- artru-
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that the degree of discipline imposed was
contrary to the state's policy of progressive
discipline. See id, at 213. Nebraska's personnel rules and regulations provided that
"disciplinary actions are prescribed in a progressive mannerf;] however, the nature and
severity of the violation will dictate the level
of discipline imposed." Id, The rule recommended the department's use of progressive
discipline, except where an employee commits an offense of "serious magnitude." Id.
The court interpreted this provision, which is
similar to the rule applicable to this case, as
giving the department director discretion in
implementing the steps of progressive discipline. See id.; see also Brougham v. City of
Normandy, 812 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo.Ct.App.
1991) (interpreting ordinance adhering to
principles of progressive discipline to be
guide rather than mandate); Battiste v. Department of Soc. Servs., 154 MicLApp. 486,
398 N.W.2d 447, 450 (1986) ("Progressive
discipline may be utilized at the discretion of
the commission . . . where an agency is given
discretion to 'suspend or dismiss' an employee for cause.'"). We follow the Percival
courts reasoning and hold that the use of
progressive discipline is committed to the
Chiefs discretion, based on the Chiefs determination of the severity of the offense.

rather than progressive discipline in cas
involving dishonesty.
[30] Both the Commission's and the I
partment's rules, however, require that a:
discipline be administered fairly and cons:
tentiy. See Murray City Sendee Commi
sion's Rules and Regulation, Section 11(1996); see also Murray City Police Depai
ment Policies and Procedures, § 520, I vrei
erating policy that "like penalties be impost
for like offenses"). The record reveals th;
in only one other case has an officer be*
discharged for dishonesty. In that case, tl
officer, with two-and-one-half years of exper
ence, falsified police reports, falsified worl
ers compensation claims, falsified proper!
reports, and damaged City property to cove
the lies. However, in the two other case
involving the sole charge of dishonesty, on
officer was suspended for one day, and th
other officer was suspended for two week;

In light of all the circumstances, we con
elude that, even assuming that Lucas wa
dishonest regarding the placement of hi;
gun—bolstered or unholstered—termination
is so disproportionate to the charge that i
amounts to an abuse of the Chiefs discretion
First, the dishonesty charge was based on ar
unsubstantiated claim of excessive force—
which never conclusively determined tht
Moreover, under the Murray City Police placement of Lucas's gun. Second, the eviDepartment Policies and Procedures, § 555, dence supporting the dishonesty charge was
IX (A), an officer may be disciplined, which slim and inconsistent. Third, the record
includes termination, for untruthfulness in an shows that other officers disciplined solely
internal affairs investigation. Under the De- for dishonesty were suspended rather than
partment's stated policies, the Chief may im- discharged. Finally. Lucas's service record
pose a range of punishment from reprimand is exemplary. Lucas has served as a Murray
to termination for the charge of dishonesty. City police officer for twelve years. Dunn?
We agree with Murray City's statement that that time. Lucas's record shows that he hart
police officers are "in a position of trust" and at all times met or exceeded the Department's expectations, and, based on the comare thus "held to the highest standards of
ments in the service record, Lucas was conbehavior." Paulino i\ Civil Sew. Commit,
sidered an excellent officer. According to
175 Ca2:App.3d 962, 221 Cal.Rptr. 90. 96
Lucas's record, there is no evidence of an>
(1985). "[Hjonesty and credibility are crucial
oral or written reprimands, warnings, or aeto [an officer's] proper performance of his [or
cipiinary action taken against him. To t.c
her] duties." Id.; see also Ackerman v. Calcontrary, the record shows that Lucas ^ ifornia State Personnel Bd., 145 Cal.App.3d
only Murray City police officer to have recOc, 192 Cal.Rptr. 190. 193 1983^ ("'Dishonceived the Merit of Honor award.
esty in such matters of public trust is intolerEven assuming that Lucas was ^ h ° * J
able.' " (citation omitted);. As such, under
the Department's rules 2TL(I reirulations, the ahort t*P rv^itinn of his eun, termina -> -_
' ^ ^ ' ^ ^ - r . - ^ r ^ under the fee* v'
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this case tc the charge of dishonesty that it
amounted to an abuse of the Chiefs discretion. Therefore, the Commission abused its
discretion in affirming the Chiefs decision
ordering that Lucas be terminated.
CONCLUSION
Under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012, a
civil service employee has a vested property
interest in continued employment absent sufficient cause for discharge. Therefore, before termination, a civil service employee is
entitled to due process requiring oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of
the employer's evidence, an opportunity to
respond to the charges in "something less"
than a full evidentiary hearing before termination, coupled with a full post-termination
hearing "at a meaningful time."
We conclude that Lucas's due process
rights were not violated by the delay in the
internal affairs investigation, the lack of
written notice of the allegations where Lucas
had actual notice, the exclusion of the audiotape evidence for impeachment purposes, or
the Commission's use of a legal advisor.
However, because evidence supporting Lucas's retaliatory discharge claim was directly
relevant and material to Chief Killian's and
Lieutenant Fondaco's credibility and was required for the Commission's proper review of
Chief Killian's decision, the Commission's exclusion of such evidence violated Lucas's due
process right to a full and fair hearing.
In addition, we conclude the Commission
abused its discretion in affirming Chief Killito's decision to discharge Officer Lucas.
First, the Commission's finding that Officer
Lucas was dishonest was not supported by
substantial evidence. Second, even if the
evidence supported such a finding, termi^ o n & so disproportionate to the charge of
"Aonesty under the facts of this case as to
^ount to an abuse of the Chiefs discretion.
J [ k ^ision of the Commission upholding
^
Killian's termination of Officer Lucas is
ersed. Officer Lucas is reinstated with
**ck pay.

section III of the main opinion. As set forth
therein, the evidence simply does not support
the Commission's finding that Lucas lied
about the position of his gun when he
searched Spegar at the station. That discussion being dispositive, I would not opine
about other aspects of the case.
As recognized by the main opinion, Lucas
asks alternatively for reinstatement or a new
hearing. He first contends that the Commission should be reversed and that he should
be reinstated with back pay because the facts
do not support termination for the dishonesty
charge and, in any event, termination is disproportionate to the charge. As an alternative argument, he contends that he is entitled
to another hearing because his rights to due
process were violated.
I share some of the main opinion's concerns over whether Lucas was afforded due
process at the hearing before the Commission. I am particularly bothered by the
Commission's exclusion of evidence that Lucas was discharged out of retaliation for having filed misconduct claims against Lieutenant Fondaco and the Murray City Police
Department. However, given our decision to
reinstate Lucas without any further hearing,
the discussions about due process and proportionality are mere dicta, which may or
may not be correct.
I therefore concur only in the result.
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